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ABSTRACT
In bifurcated patent litigation systems, claims of infringement and validity of a patent are decided independently
of each other in separate court proceedings at different courts. In non-bifurcated systems, infringement and
validity are decided jointly in the same proceedings at a single court. We build a model that shows the key
trade-off between bifurcated and non-bifurcated systems and how it affects the incentives of plaintiffs and
defendants in patent infringement cases. Using detailed data on patent litigation cases in Germany (bifurcated)
and the U.K. (non-bifurcated), we show that bifurcation creates situations in which a patent is held infringed
that is subsequently invalidated. We also show that having to challenge a patent’s validity in separate court
proceedings under bifurcation implies that alleged infringers are less likely to do so. We find this to apply in
particular to more resource-constrained alleged infringers. Finally, we find parties to be more likely to settle in
a bifurcated system.
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1 Introduction
Patents are probabilistic property rights: there exists inherent uncertainty regarding a
patent’s validity and scope (Lemley and Shapiro, 2005). Although patents are granted
by patent offices only after substantive examination, there is no guarantee that a granted
patent is in fact valid.1 We show that the uncertainty that surrounds the validity of
patents has important effects on patent enforcement and hence on the functioning of
the patent system as a whole.
In patent litigation, patent holders allege the infringement of their patent right while
defendants can deny infringement and challenge the validity of the patent in question.
In many legal systems, such as the U.K., Italy, or Switzerland, the infringement and
validity claims are decided simultaneously in the same court proceedings where the
invalidation of a patent renders infringement impossible. In many other jurisdictions,
including the U.S., Germany, and China, there is some separation of patent infringement
and validity proceedings – so-called bifurcation.2 The purpose of this paper is to analyze
the effect of bifurcation on litigation behavior and outcomes.
Using detailed case-level data from German courts where infringement and validity
are separated into independent proceedings, we show that in practice the decision on
infringement is often made and enforced before validity has been determined under
the presumption that granted patents are indeed valid. We show that this leads to
situations in which a patent is held infringed that is subsequently invalidated. Our
data on infringement and invalidity proceedings in Germany for 2000 to 2008 reveal
that 12% of infringement cases with parallel invalidity proceedings (41% if we focus on
cases without settlements) produce divergent, i.e., ‘invalid but infringed’, decisions (for
examples see Table A-1 in the online appendix). Our analysis also shows that the length
of this injunction gap is substantial. In cases where validity was challenged in court,
the infringement decision was on average enforceable for more than a year before the
patent was invalidated in first instance.
We build a theoretical model that illustrates the key trade-offs between bifurcated
and non-bifurcated systems. First, our model incorporates the possibility of an injunc-
tion gap in the bifurcated system. In addition, challenging a patent’s validity requires
additional costs in the bifurcated system compared to non-bifurcated systems because
validity has to be challenged in separate proceedings at a different court. At the same
time, bifurcated systems allow for specialization of infringement and invalidity courts.
In particular the question of validity requires in-depth technical expertise, which courts
that focus on invalidity in a bifurcated system are rather able to provide. This leads
presumably to a lower incidence of errors, in particular Type I errors, i.e., fewer invalid
1Mann and Underweiser (2012) for example, show that since 2003 the U.S. Federal Circuit has held
nearly 60% of patents considered invalid.
2Germany and China have bifurcated systems in which separate courts decide independently on patent
infringement and validity. In the U.S., courts decide on both infringement and invalidity simultane-
ously. However, the Inter Partes Review (IPR) which was introduced by the America Invents Act (AIA)
in September 2012 as a way of challenging validity administratively at the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office post-grant has de facto introduced bifurcation into the U.S. system (Chien and Helmers, 2015). In
2013, roughly a third of litigated patents in the U.S. were challenged through an IPR.
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patents are erroneously maintained in force.
Our model shows that the separation between validity and infringement reduces the
likelihood that an alleged infringer challenges a patent’s validity. We confirm that this
holds in practice by comparing the likelihood of validity challenges between infringe-
ment cases in Germany and the U.K. (a non-bifurcated system where infringement and
validity challenges are decided in the same proceedings).3 The results show that al-
leged infringers in the U.K. are significantly more likely to challenge a patent’s validity
than alleged infringers in Germany. We also find empirical evidence that in Germany,
in particular smaller firms are less likely to file an invalidity action when they are sued
for infringement. We find no evidence that this is also the case in the U.K. These find-
ings suggest that more resource-constrained firms are less likely to challenge a patent’s
validity in a bifurcated litigation system. The broader implications of this effect are
twofold: on the one hand the share of cases where an infringed patent is invalidated
is downward biased under bifurcation; on the other hand the strong presumption of
validity that is built into the bifurcated litigation system becomes self-reinforcing.
Our model also allows us to compare settlement behavior under the bifurcated and
non-bifurcated systems. The model shows that the effect of bifurcation on the extent
of adverse selection and its effect on the joint surplus from settlement (the part of the
joint surplus from settlement captured by the patent holder) are the two key drivers of
the impact of bifurcation on the settlement rate (settlement amount). Depending on
the signs and magnitudes of these two effects, bifurcation can either lead to a higher
or lower settlement rate (settlement amount). A comparison of settlement behavior
between German and U.K. cases reveals that significantly fewer cases settle in the U.K.
We also find some evidence that smaller, more resource-constrained firms in Germany
are less likely to settle.
Our research contributes to the existing literature on the design and functioning
of patent litigation systems by offering for the first time quantitative evidence on the
implications of the separation of infringement and validity. This is not only of direct
relevance to Germany, where by far the largest number of patent cases in Europe are
litigated (Cremers et al., 2016), but also played an important role in the current heated
discussion about the design of the Unified Patent Court (UPC) in Europe. For example,
a group of large firms across industries, including Adidas, Apple, Deutsche Post DHL,
Google, and Samsung,4 issued a joint statement in 2014 voicing concerns that “[...] the
potential exists for a court to order an injunction prohibiting the importation and sale
of goods even though the patent may ultimately be found invalid. This result unduly
reduces competition, can increase the cost of products in the market and reduce product
choices, all negatively impacting consumers.”
Apart from its relevance for Germany and the European UPC, our research provides
important insights also for countries that rely on similar bifurcated litigation systems,
including some of the world’s top patenting countries, such as China, Japan, and Ko-
rea. It also informs jurisdictions that allow for some intermediate degree of separation
3The U.K. comprises separate legal systems: England & Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. Our
data focus on England & Wales where the the overwhelming majority of cases occur.
4The complete list is: Adidas, AFDEL, Apple, ARM, BlackBerry, Broadcom, Bull, Cisco Systems, Dell,
Deutsche Post DHL, ESIA, Google, HP, Huawei, Microsoft, Samsung, SFIB, Telecom Italia, and Vodafone.
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between infringement and validity. In the U.S., for example, validity challenges in form
of an Inter Partes Review (IPR) are decided faster than infringement cases at district
courts.5 Hence, bifurcation in the U.S. means that validity is decided first. Our analysis
suggests that this avoids the problem of the injunction gap associated with the Ger-
man type of bifurcation. Further research could investigate whether the separation of
invalidity and infringement decisions introduced by the IPR may even be beneficial.
Taking a broader perspective, our evidence underscores the probabilistic nature of
patents. We show that patents that a court presumes valid when deciding on infringe-
ment often turn out to be invalid upon closer scrutiny. Patents involved in court disputes
are only the tip of the patent iceberg and clearly a non-random selection. Regardless,
our evidence supports the general view that legal rights in form of patents are inher-
ently associated with enormous uncertainty. We also show that bifurcation compounds
the undersupply of validity challenges in court that has been shown to exist in non-
bifurcated systems (Farrell and Merges, 2004). This means that the strong presumption
of validity of a probabilistic right, which is built into the bifurcated litigation system,
distorts incentives to the patent holder’s advantage. Our evidence also suggests that
this affects in particular smaller companies as they are less likely to defend themselves
against potential patent infringement by challenging the patent’s validity. A resulting
increased likelihood of facing an injunction for patent infringement may well impact
the behavior of smaller companies, it might in particular affect their innovative activity.
Our findings also add to the existing literature on the settlement of patent disputes.
Galasso and Schankerman (2010), for example, suggest that the establishment of the
Court of Appeals of the Federal Circuit (CAFC) – which was perceived as patentee-
friendly – led to more settlements early on in a patent dispute because of reduced un-
certainty over the outcome of a case. Our finding that parties are more likely to settle
in a bifurcated litigation system due to the lower rate of Type I errors is consistent with
the evidence provided by Galasso and Schankerman (2010). Our analysis, therefore,
offers empirical evidence directly relevant for the long-standing, largely theoretical de-
bate on the design of patent (enforcement) systems and its effect on companies (Aoki
and Hu, 1999; Ayres and Klemperer, 1999; Crampes and Langinier, 2002; Boyce and
Hollis, 2007; Eckert and Langinier, 2013).
Our analysis is also related to the law and economics literature on the design of liti-
gation systems more generally. Specifically, there is a theoretical literature on sequential
vs. unitary trials (Landes, 1993; Chen et al., 1997; Landes, 1998). This literature dis-
tinguishes more generally between unitary and sequential trials, where in a sequential
trial the legal dispute is broken up into multiple dispositive issues – for example the
separation between liability and damages in tort cases in the U.S. The court’s decision
at each stage of the sequential trial influences the subsequent stage, either directly by
shutting the door to proceeding with the next stage or by revealing information about
the expected outcome of the next stage.6 Our setting differs substantially because the
trial on the second issue (invalidity) is initiated before the the trial on the first issue
5In any case, infringement cases are usually stayed pending an IPR.
6Following Landes (1993), in this literature German bifurcation could be classified as some type of
“reverse bifurcation” as validity, which can prevent the infringement suit from proceeding is decided
after infringement.
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(infringement) has been decided. Also, the separate trials take place at different courts
which increases the additional costs involved in the second (invalidity) trial. More-
over, the second action (invalidity) is taken by the defendant, not the plaintiff in the
infringement suit. As such our analysis also contributes to the literature on unitary vs.
sequential trials by extending the framework to a setting where a trial is broken into
overlapping dispositive issues. Moreover, the analysis of sequential vs. unitary trials so
far has been characterized by a complete lack of empirical evidence. As such our empir-
ical analysis offers for the first time empirical evidence on the implications of sequential
trials.
Finally, our analysis is also related to the law and economics literature on judicial
errors (Png, 1986; Lando, 2006; Rizzolli and Stanca, 2012). Our setting offers a novel
perspective on the the issue. We show that there is a trade-off in the bifurcated system
between a lower probability of a Type I error in the invalidity decision on the one hand,
and on the other a higher likelihood of a Type I error in the infringement decision due to
the lower likelihood of challenging validity. In other words, conditional on challenging
validity, the bifurcated system generates fewer false positives (i.e. more likely to inval-
idate an invalid patent), but the large cost of challenging validity means that alleged
infringers might be found to infringe a patent that would have been invalidated, had
its validity been challenged (false positive in the infringement decision).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: the next section provides a short
description of the German and U.K. patent litigation systems with particular focus on
the interplay between infringement and invalidity proceedings. Section 3 discusses our
theoretical model. Section 4 describes the data used in our analysis. Section 5 presents
our empirical findings and Section 6 offers some concluding thoughts and suggestions
for further research. An extensive online appendix provides additional information and
analysis.
2 Bifurcated vs. Non-Bifurcated Patent Litigation Sys-
tems
This section explains the design of the German bifurcated patent litigation system as
well as the U.K. non-bifurcated system with the discussion focusing on the separation
of infringement and invalidity claims.
2.1 Germany’s Bifurcated Patent Litigation System
2.1.1 Court System
Regional courts (Landgerichte – LGs) have jurisdiction over patent infringement.7 There
are twelve regional courts that serve as first instance courts in infringement proceed-
7Infringement claims must be based on a patent granted by the DPMA (DE) or the EPO with effect
for Germany (EP).
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ings.8 A panel of three legally trained judges decide on infringement. Decisions by
the regional courts can be appealed before a higher regional court (Oberlandesgericht –
OLG). In exceptional cases, a further appeal can be brought before the Patent Division
of the German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof – BGH) in third instance.
A patent’s validity is challenged either through opposition filed at the patent of-
fice which granted the patent right (European Patent Office – EPO – for EP patents or
Deutsches Patent- und Markenamt – DPMA – for DE patents) or through an invalidity
action filed at the German Federal Patent Court (Bundespatentgericht – BPatG).9 As a
specialized court, the BPatG deploys judges with both legal and technical training.10
Appeals to the decisions by the BPatG are directly brought before the Patent Division
of the BGH that reviews infringement proceedings. The structure of the German court
system is summarized in Figure A-1 in the online appendix, and online appendix A
provides more details on infringement and invalidity proceedings.
2.1.2 Interaction of Infringement and Invalidity Proceedings
If a patent is invalidated, any pending infringement proceedings based on the patent
will be dismissed. This still allows for situations where decisions on infringement can
be (preliminarily) enforced based on an invalid patent if infringement is decided before
invalidity is. The occurrence of such divergent decisions crucially depends on (a) the
timing and (b) duration of infringement and invalidity proceedings:
(a) Mostly filed as a defensive reaction to an infringement action, validity challenges
are usually filed after the corresponding infringement proceedings.11 Figure A-3
in the online appendix shows the time lag between the filing of infringement and
invalidity actions in our data. We find that more than 55% of parallel invalidity
proceedings are initiated at least four months after the infringement proceeding.
(b) Invalidity proceedings take significantly longer than infringement proceedings in
first instance (see Figure A-4 in the online appendix), thus increasing the tempo-
ral spread between the decisions. Opposition proceedings also take significantly
longer than infringement proceedings. The litigants may request acceleration of
the proceeding, still, an opposition takes on average 20 to 30 months.12
In combination, (a) and (b) imply in practice that decisions on invalidity follow
infringement decisions with a considerable lag.
The alleged infringer may request to stay the infringement proceeding until a de-
cision on validity is available (see Figure 1). In practice, infringement courts rely by
8These are the regional courts in Berlin, Braunschweig, Düsseldorf, Erfurt, Frankfurt, Hamburg,
Leipzig, Magdeburg, Mannheim, Munich, Nuremberg-Furth, and Saarbrücken. Each regional court has
at least one chamber primarily designated to patent cases.
9The responsibilities of the BPatG are twofold. It serves as the appeals court for decisions of the
DPMA concerning DE patent applications, and it hears invalidity actions for DE and EP (with effect for
Germany) patents.
10The panel consists of five judges: three technically trained judges as well as two legally trained
judges.
11This is often due to the time required to prepare the case, in particular the search for prior art that
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Figure 1: Timing of infringement and invalidity proceedings in bifurcated and non-
bifurcated systems
Bifurcated Patent Litigation System (as practiced in Germany):
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case law on a strong presumption of validity. That is, infringement proceedings are only
stayed if there is an overwhelmingly large probability that the patent will not be upheld
in its current form. So, even though the judges at the infringement court do not con-
sider the validity of the patent in their judgment on infringement, they have to form an
opinion on the likelihood of invalidity to decide on a stay (Fock and Bartenbach, 2010).
This poses a considerable challenge as infringement court judges are rarely technically
trained and limited resources restrict a thorough investigation of the patent’s validity.
Usually, the corresponding validity challenges are not yet at a stage where they could
provide guidance on the likelihood of invalidity. Infringement court judges are there-
fore forced to stay at their own discretion.
If decisions on infringement are made faster than decisions on validity, a court may
establish infringement although the patent is eventually invalidated. In fact, in Ger-
many, if infringement is found in first instance, any injunction resulting from this de-
cision is enforceable regardless of an appeal or any pending validity challenge. This
means the greater the temporal spread between infringement and validity decisions,
the longer a patent may be wrongfully enforced. Even if the patent is invalidated in
first instance, the patent holder can continue to enforce the patent as long as the deci-
sion is not binding. This injunction gap may, therefore, extend beyond the first instance
invalidity decision. This creates strong incentives to appeal the infringement decision
can be used to challenge the patent’s validity (Kühnen, 2013).
12Harhoff et al. (2007) reports a median length of opposition proceedings at the EPO of about four
years (including appeal).
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while awaiting the outcome of the validity challenge. The result is considerable legal
uncertainty over the outcome of the infringement dispute, potential delays in enforce-
ment, increased litigation costs, and the possibility of an injunction gap.
2.2 U.K.’s Non-Bifurcated Patent Litigation System
In the U.K. patent disputes are heard exclusively by two courts,13 the Patents County
Court (PCC), which was renamed to Intellectual Property Enterprise Court (IPEC) at
the end of 2013,14 and the Patents Court, a specialist court part of the High Court of
England and Wales (see Figure A-2 in the online appendix).15 Both courts are located
in London. The IPEC generally hears cases of lower value and complexity, with total
recoverable costs and damages capped at £50,000 and £500,000 respectively. In both
courts, cases are decided by a single, technically trained judge. Appeals are heard by
the Court of Appeal (CA) and in exceptional cases by the Supreme Court (formerly the
House of Lords).
The U.K. patent litigation system is non-bifurcated, which means that infringement
and invalidity claims are decided simultaneously (see Figure 1). As a result, if a patent
is invalidated by the court, it cannot be found to be infringed. Therefore, the invalid
but infringed scenario cannot arise in the non-bifurcated system. That said, invalidity
challenges still have to be raised as counterclaims and pursued by the defendants.16 The
structure of the U.K. court system is summarized in Figure A-2 in the online appendix,
and online appendix B offers more details on the U.K. litigation system.
3 Model
This section presents a model that illustrates the key trade-off between bifurcated and
non-bifurcated systems and explores its implications on parties’ incentives to sue for
patent infringement, challenge validity, and settle the case.
3.1 Litigation in the non-bifurcated system
We consider a patent holder (plaintiff) P and an alleged infringer (defendant) D. The
patent holder can decide whether to sue the alleged infringer. If he does so, the alleged
infringer can file a counterclaim to invalidate the patent. In this section we consider a
non-bifurcated litigation system: whenever the patent’s validity is challenged, the issues
of infringement and validity are decided simultaneously by the same court. Hence, we
13Infringement claims must be based on a patent granted by the U.K. Intellectual Property Office (GB)
or the EPO with effect for the U.K. (EP).
14The PCC/IPEC underwent a series of comprehensive reforms between 2010 and 2013 which are
described in Fox (2014) and Helmers et al. (2015).
15Infringement claims must be based on a patent granted by the U.K. Intellectual Property Office or the
EPO with effect for the U.K. Note that the U.K. Intellectual Property office does not grant utility models.
16Note that validity of EP patents can also be challenged through opposition at the EPO, but there is
no opposition procedure for national patents with the U.K. Intellectual Property Office (although there
is a procedure via its opinion service).
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assume that the alleged infringer does not need to incur any additional litigation costs
to challenge the patent’s validity.
Denote CP and CD the litigation costs of the patent holder and the alleged infringer,
respectively. Furthermore, denote θ the probability that a court finds the defendant to
infringe the patent and αnb the probability that the patent’s validity is upheld by the
court if challenged. If the court finds that the patent is invalid, the alleged infringer gets
a payoff ID, which is allowed to be either positive, negative or zero,
17 while the patent
holder incurs a loss LP (i.e., gets a payoff −LP).18 If the court finds that the patent is
valid and infringed, the patent holder derives a benefit BP ,
19 while the infringer incurs
a loss LD (i.e., gets a payoff −LD).20 If the court finds that the patent is valid but
not infringed, we assume that neither the alleged infringer nor the patent holder are
affected by this decision. The probability of infringement θ ∈ θ ,θ is known to the
alleged infringer while the patent holder only knows that it is drawn from a uniform
distribution over
 
θ , θ¯

.
The timing of the game is as follows:
Stage 1: The patent holder P decides whether to sue the alleged infringer D. If
he does not sue for infringement, the game ends. If he does, the game proceeds
to the next stage.
Stage 2: The alleged infringer D decides whether to challenge the patent’s valid-
ity.
Stage 3: The court hands down its judgment regarding infringement and validity
if the patent’s validity was challenged in Stage 2. Otherwise, the court hands
down its judgment regarding the infringement claim.
Consider first the alleged infringer’s incentives to challenge the patent’s validity. If
the alleged infringer decides to file an invalidity counterclaim in Stage 2, his expected
payoff is given by −αnbθ LD +
 
1−αnb ID − CD, while his expected payoff if he decides
not to do so is −θ LD − CD. Therefore, the alleged infringer challenges the patent’s
validity if and only if
−αnbθ LD +
 
1−αnb ID − CD > −θ LD − CD
17One reason why ID can be negative is that invalidating a patent is similar to removing an entry
barrier, which may hurt both the patent holder and the alleged infringer. The payoff ID can be positive if
the patent’s invalidation allows the alleged infringer to save some costs he was incurring to build around
the patent and reduce the probability of infringing it. Another reason why ID can be positive is that the
alleged infringer may be using a technology that he was unable to license to third parties when the patent
was still presumed valid (because potential licensees fear infringing that patent) but that he can license
if the patent is invalidated. Finally, if the patent holder was “hiding” his patent and shows up only after
the alleged infringer has made an action that could infringe the patent, it is reasonable to assume that
ID = 0.
18The patent holder may incur this loss because current licensees will stop paying their license fees.
19The benefit BP may capture for instance the damages paid by the infringer and/or additional market
profits resulting from an injunction.
20The loss LD may capture for instance the damages paid to the patent holder and/or any loss in market
profits due to an injunction.
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which is the same as
ID > −θ LD
Since θ ∈ θ ,θ, the latter holds if and only if
θ > θ˜ nb ≡

θ if θ > −IDLD−ID
LD
if −IDLD ∈

θ ,θ

θ if θ ≤ −IDLD
When θ˜ nb = θ , the alleged infringer always challenges the patent’s validity. If −IDLD ∈
θ ,θ

, he does so only when the probability of infringement is large enough. Finally,
if θ˜ nb = θ , he never challenges the patent’s validity.
Let us now consider the patent holder’s incentives to sue for infringement. The
patent holder’s expected payoff from suing the alleged infringer is
1
θ − θ

θ˜ nb∫
θ
(θBP − CP) dθ +
θ∫
θ˜ nb

θαnbBP −
 
1−αnb LP − CP dθ

=
1
θ − θ
 
1−αnbBP
2
 
θ˜ nb
2
+ LP θ˜
nb − LPθ

+
αnbBP
2
θ
2 − BP
2
θ 2

− CP
because the alleged infringer challenges the patent’s validity if and only if θ > θ˜ nb.
Therefore, the patent holder will sue the alleged infringer if and only if
CP ≤ 1
θ − θ
 
1−αnbBP
2
 
θ˜ nb
2
+ LP θ˜
nb − LPθ

+
αnbBP
2
θ
2 − BP
2
θ 2

≡ C˜nbP (1)
3.2 Litigation in the bifurcated system
In the bifurcated litigation system, validity and infringement of a patent are decided
separately and independently. We assume that two different courts deal with infringe-
ment and validity and that the court dealing with infringement hands down its judg-
ment first. To account for the main features of the bifurcated system, we modify the
benchmark setting above in a number of ways. First, we consider an alternative timing:
Stage 1: The patent holder P decides whether to sue the alleged infringer D. If
he does not sue for infringement, the game ends. If he does, the game proceeds
to the next stage.
Stage 2: The alleged infringer D decides whether to challenge the patent’s valid-
ity.
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Stage 3: The court dealing with infringement hands down its judgment.
Stage 4: The court dealing with validity hands down its judgment if the patent’s
validity was challenged in Stage 2.
Second, we assume that challenging the patent’s validity before another court re-
quires additional litigation cost cD for the alleged infringer. Third, we assume that
when the patent is found infringed and eventually invalidated, the alleged infringer
gets a payoff ID− lD where lD ≥ 0 (instead of ID under the non-bifurcated system), and
the patent holder receives a payoff bP − LP where bP ≥ 0 (instead of −LP under the
non-bifurcated system). This captures the fact that during the period between the de-
cisions by the two courts (the injunction gap), the patent holder may be able to enforce
his patent, for instance through an injunction.21
Finally, assume that the probability that the patent’s validity is upheld under the bi-
furcated system, which we denote αb, is smaller than the corresponding probability un-
der the non-bifurcated system: αb ≤ αnb. This captures the fact that a non-specialized
court is more likely to make a Type I error when assessing the validity of a patent. It is
indeed reasonable to assume that a specialized court is rather able to assess the rele-
vance of prior art to invalidate the patent than a non-specialized court.22 Note that, in
our model, the non-bifurcated system can be regarded as a special case of the bifurcated
system in which cD = 0, lD = 0, bP = 0, and αb = αnb.
In this setting, the alleged infringer will challenge the patent’s validity if and only
if his expected payoff from doing so
−θαb LD + θ
 
1−αb (ID − lD) + (1− θ )  1−αb ID − CD − cD
is greater than his expected payoff from facing the infringement suit without challeng-
ing the patent’s validity, i.e., −θ LD−CD. Hence, the patent’s validity will be challenged
if and only if
θ >
−ID
LD − lD +
cD
(1−αb) (LD − lD)
Since θ ∈ θ ,θ, the latter holds if and only if
θ > θ˜ b ≡

θ if θ > −IDLD−lD +
cD
(1−αb)(LD−lD)−ID
LD−lD +
cD
(1−αb)(LD−lD) if
−ID
LD−lD +
cD
(1−αb)(LD−lD) ∈

θ ,θ

θ if θ ≤ −IDLD−lD + cD(1−αb)(LD−lD)
21In Germany, the alleged infringer may seek compensation after the patent is invalidated but is typi-
cally unable to get full compensation (see also Section 2.1.2).
22A key argument for specialization is that sufficient judicial expertise with the law as well as with
technology is crucial for accurate decision-making in patent litigation (cf. Moore, 2001; Pegram, 2000;
Kesan and Ball, 2011). In particular, in order to accurately determine a patent’s validity, judges require
a sound understanding of the relevant, potentially invalidating, prior art. This usually requires in-depth
knowledge of the corresponding technology field. Inline with this argument, we assume that judges
at specialized courts are more likely to have that knowledge thanks to their technical background and
training. They are also in a better position to accumulate technological expertise due to their focus on
patent validity.
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Let us now examine the patent holder’s decision to sue for infringement. If validity
is challenged then the patent holder’s expected payoff is
θαbBp + θ
 
1−αb (bP − LP)− (1− θ )  1−αb LP − CP
which can be rewritten as
θ
 
αbBp +
 
1−αb bP−  1−αb LP − CP
Thus, the patent holder’s expected payoff from suing the alleged infringer is
1
θ − θ

θ˜ b∫
θ
θBP dθ +
θ∫
θ˜ b

θ
 
αbBP +
 
1−αb bP−  1−αb LP dθ
−CP
=
1
θ − θ
¨ 
1−αb(BP − bP)
2
 
θ˜ b
2
+ LP θ˜
b − LPθ

+
αbBP +
 
1−αb bP
2
θ
2 − BP
2
θ 2
«
− CP
because the alleged infringer challenges the patent’s validity if and only if θ > θ˜ b.
Therefore, the patent holder will sue the alleged infringer if and only if
CP ≤ 1
θ − θ
¨ 
1−αb(BP − bP)
2
 
θ˜ b
2
+ LP θ˜
b − LPθ

+
αbBP +
 
1−αb bP
2
θ
2 − BP
2
θ 2
«
≡ C˜ bP
(2)
3.3 Comparison of the two systems
Let us first compare the alleged infringer’s incentives to challenge validity under the
two systems. This boils down to comparing the thresholds θ˜ nb and θ˜ b.
We need to distinguish two cases:
1. If ID > 0 then θ˜
nb = θ ≤ θ˜ b.
2. If ID ≤ 0 then −ID
LD
≤ −ID
LD − lD +
cD
(1−αb) (LD − lD)
which yields
θ˜ nb = min

max
−ID
LD
,θ

,θ

≤min

max
 −ID
LD − lD +
cD
(1−αb) (LD − lD) ,θ

,θ

= θ˜ b
Thus, in both cases, it holds that θ˜ nb ≤ θ˜ b, which yields the following result:
Proposition 1. Bifurcation has a negative effect on the alleged infringer’s incentives to
challenge the patent’s validity.
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Let us now compare the patent holder’s incentives to sue for infringement under
both systems. To do that, we need to compare the thresholds C˜nbP and C˜
b
P .
From (2) it follows that C˜ bP increases with α
b and bP and decreases with cD (because
θ˜ b increases with cD). This, combined with the fact that C˜
nb
P is equal to C˜
b
P in the special
case αb = αnb, bP = 0 and cD = 0, shows that a switch from the non-bifurcated system
to the bifurcated system affects the patent holder’s incentives to sue for infringement
through two opposite forces:
1. The existence of an injunction gap (and more precisely the benefit bP the patent
holder derives from it) and the deterrence effect of the additional cost cD to chal-
lenge the patent’s validity increases the patent holder’s incentives to sue for in-
fringement.
2. The decrease in Type I errors (and the corresponding decrease in the probability
that the patent’s validity is upheld by the court) decreases the patent holder’s
incentives to sue for infringement.
These two opposite forces capture the trade-off induced by bifurcation from the
patent holder’s perspective. Whether the patent holder will have higher or lower incen-
tives to sue for infringement under the bifurcated system (i.e. whether C˜ bP is higher or
lower than C˜nbP ) depends on the relative magnitude of these two forces: the higher bP
and cD (the lower α
b), the higher (lower) the likelihood that bifurcation will result in
more infringement suits.
Thus, we get the following result:
Proposition 2. Bifurcation has an ambiguous effect on the patent holder’s incentives to
sue for infringement.
3.4 Testable predictions
Proposition 2 produces ambiguous predictions regarding the decision to sue for patent
infringement. Unfortunately, this prediction is not empirically testable because it would
require data on the population of patent disputes. However, only disputes that are liti-
gated in court are visible, hence we are unable to compute the patent holder’s propen-
sity to sue for infringement.
In contrast, our model (Proposition 1) generates a clear-cut result regarding the
effect of bifurcation on validity challenges which leads to a prediction that can be tested
using the available data:
Prediction 1: Alleged infringers challenge patent validity less often under a bifurcated
system than under a non-bifurcated system.
In our model, the alleged infringer’s incentives to challenge validity depends on his
litigation costs under the bifurcated system (through the additional cost cD he has to
incur to file an invalidity counterclaim in a different court), while this is not true under
the non-bifurcated system. This implies that the alleged infringer’s characteristics that
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affect his litigation costs (in particular cD) should affect his incentives to challenge
validity under the bifurcated system but not under the non-bifurcated system. We focus
here on the effect of the defendant’s size sD on these incentives.
More specifically, we make the following assumption: other things equal, smaller
defendants incur higher litigation costs, i.e. ∂ cD/∂ sD < 0. Smaller firms are commonly
seen as more resource-constrained due to higher capital costs (Carpenter and Petersen,
2002; Hall, 2002). Therefore, it is not surprising that several studies have found that
patent litigation places a heavier burden on smaller companies (Lerner, 1995; Lanjouw
and Lerner, 2001; Agarwal et al., 2009; Bessen and Meurer, 2013). Greenhalgh et al.
(2010) offer direct qualitative survey-based evidence that indicates that the burden
imposed by patent litigation costs is inversely proportional to firm size. In particular,
time and management resources that have to be dedicated to litigation weigh heavier
on small companies. Small firms are also less likely to afford in-house legal counsel,
which further increases their costs of litigation (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004).
Under the above assumption, the threshold θ˜ b above which an alleged infringer
decides to challenge validity increases with his size sD. Therefore, our model generates
the following testable prediction:
Prediction 2: Other things equal, smaller defendants are less likely to challenge validity
under the bifurcated system, while the size of alleged infringers does not affect their
incentives to challenge validity under the non-bifurcated system.
3.5 Extension: Settlement
In an extension of the model, we allow the patent holder and the alleged infringer to
reach a settlement before the court judgment. More specifically, we allow the patent
holder to make a take-it-or-leave-it settlement offer to the alleged infringer before the
latter decides whether to file an invalidity counterclaim. Given that the alleged infringer
has private information about the infringement probability, the settlement subgame is a
screening game in which the patent holder makes a settlement offer which is accepted
(turned down) by defendants that have a probability of infringement above (below)
a critical threshold. We characterize the equilibrium settlement amount and critical
threshold under both systems and compare them.
We consider the following extension of the game studied above:
Stage 1: P decides whether to file an infringement claim. If he does not, the
game ends; otherwise, it proceeds to the next stage.
Stage 2: P makes a take-it-or-leave-it settlement offer to D.23
Stage 3: D decides whether to accept the offer. If it is accepted, the game ends;
otherwise it proceeds to the next stage.
23We focus on settlements that occur after a claim is filed because these are the only ones that we can
observe in the data.
13
Stage 4: P decides whether to drop the infringement case. If he does, the game
ends; otherwise, the patent holder and the alleged infringer incur litigation costs
CP and CD, respectively, and the game proceeds to the next stage.
Stage 5: D decides whether to challenge the patent’s validity (before the same
court under the non-bifurcated system and before a different court under the
bifurcated system).
Stage 6: Court decisions regarding infringement, and validity if challenged, are
handed down.24
As is standard in the theoretical literature on settlement,25 we assume that the
patent holder’s litigation threat is always credible. This holds true under both the bi-
furcated and non-bifurcated systems if the following (sufficient) conditions hold
−CP + θαnbBP −
 
1−αnb LP ≥ 0
and
−CP + θ

αbBP +
 
1−αb bP−  1−αb LP ≥ 0
that is, if
θ ≥min

CP +
 
1−αnb LP
αnbBP
,
CP +
 
1−αb LP
αbBP + (1−αb) bP

This assumption implies that if settlement fails, the patent holder willl never drop the
case in Stage 4.
We make another two simplifying assumptions. First, we assume that the alleged in-
fringer’s payoff if the patent is invalidated under the non-bifurcated system is ID = 0.26
This simplifies the analysis by reducing the number of possible scenarios. In partic-
ular, the alleged infringer will always file an invalidity counterclaim under the non-
bifurcated system (in Stage 5) if he does not accept the settlement offer (in Stage 3).
Second, we assume that the patent holder’s benefit from the patent being found in-
fringed and valid (the injunction gap) is equal to the alleged infringer’s loss: BP = LD
(respectively, bP = lD).27 This assumption susbstantially simplifies the mathematical ex-
pressions and, therefore, the comparison between the outcomes under the bifurcated
and non-bifurcated systems.
24For the sake of exposition, we present a unified model in which court decisions are handed down in
the same stage under both systems. Since the courts are not strategic players in our setting, modeling
their actions as simultaneous moves under the bifurcated system (rather than sequential moves) leads
to the same outcomes as long all the payoff functions remain the same.
25See e.g. the survey by Spier (2007).
26 ID also enters the alleged infringer’s payoffs under the bifurcated system.
27The assumption BP = LD would hold for instance if the plaintiff’s (defendant’s) only benefit (loss)
from the patent being found valid and infringed is the damages paid by the defendant to the plaintiff.
The assumption bP = lD would hold for instance if the defendant’s loss from the injunction gap takes the
form of license fees paid to the patent holder.
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3.5.1 Settlement in the non-bifurcated system
Under the non-bifurcated system, the alleged infringer always challenges the patent’s
validity in Stage 5 if he turns down the settlement offer in Stage 3. Let us now consider
his decision in Stage 3. He accepts to pay an amount S to settle the infringement case if
and only if this amount is less than his expected cost from not accepting the settlement
offer, i.e.,
S < αnbθ LD + CD
which is the same as
θ > θˆ nb (S)≡ S − CD
αnb LD
Intuitively, the higher the settlement amount, the lower the probability that the settle-
ment offer is accepted by the alleged infringer.
Let us now consider the patent holder’s decision in Stage 2. The patent holder
knows that a settlement offer involving an amount S will always be accepted (i.e., will
be accepted by all types of defendants) if and only if
S ≤ Snb ≡ αnbθ LD + CD
and that a settlement offer will always be turned down if and only if
S > S¯nb ≡ αnbθ LD + CD
The patent holder also knows that an offer S ∈  Snb, S¯nbwill be accepted by the alleged
infringer with probability θ¯−θˆ
nb(S)
θ¯−θ and turned down with probability
θˆ nb(S)−θ
θ¯−θ . In the
latter scenario, the patent holder’s probability of winning (i.e., the probability that the
patent is found valid and infringed) is
αnb
θˆ nb(S)∫
θ
θdθ
θˆ nb (S)− θ =
αnb
2
 
θˆ nb (S) + θ

The following lemma provides the equilibrium settlement amount S˜nb and the corre-
sponding probability threshold θ˜ nb = θˆ nb
 
S˜nb

above which the settlement offer is
accepted.
Lemma 1. The equilibrium settlement amount is given by
S˜nb =
¨
αnb LDθ − CP −
 
1−αnb LP if θ − θ ≥ CD+CP+(1−αnb)LPαnb LD
αnbθ LD + CD otherwise
(3)
and the equilibrium offer is accepted by an alleged infringer if and only if
θ > θ˜ nb =
¨
θ − CP+CD+(1−αnb)LP
αnb LD
if θ − θ ≥ CD+CP+(1−αnb)LP
αnb LD
θ otherwise
(4)
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Proof. See online appendix C.
We find that the equilibrium settlement amount S˜nb is (weakly) increasing in LD, CD
and αnb and (weakly) decreasing in CP and LP , which is consistent with the intuition
that the settlement amount should increase if the patent holder’s (respectively, alleged
infringer’s) payoff in case settlement fails increases (respectively, decreases).
Note also that S˜nb is always such that a positive fraction of alleged infringers accept
the settlement offer. In other words, in our setup, the plaintiff never finds it optimal to
make a settlement offer that is turned down by all defendant types (which would the
same as not making a settlement offer at all).28
3.5.2 Settlement in the bifurcated system
Under the bifurcated system, it is no longer the case that the alleged infringer always
challenges the patent’s validity if he turns down the settlement offer. Under the assump-
tion ID = 0 , he will do so if and only if
cD < θ
 
1−αb (LD − lD)
which can be rewritten as
θ > θˇ (cD)≡ cD(1−αb) (LD − lD)
Therefore, the alleged infringer accepts to pay an amount S to settle the infringement
case if and only if
S <min
 
αbθ LD +
 
1−αbθ lD + CD + cD,θ LD + CD
which can be rewritten as
θ ≥ θˆ b (S, cD)≡
¨ S−CD
LD
if θ ≤ θˇ (cD)
S−CD−cD
αb LD+(1−αb)lD if θ > θˇ (cD)
3.5.3 Comparison of the two systems
We investigate here the effect of bifurcation on the (equilibrium) settlement amount
and settlement rate, focusing on the two polar scenarios θˇ (cD)< θ and θˇ (cD)≥ θ .
28Note however that this need not hold if we relax the assumption BP = LD. In particular, Remark 1 in
online appendix C shows that the patent holder finds it optimal to make a settlement offer that is turned
down with certainty if
BP >max
2LD, 2
αnb

θ + θ
 αnbθ LD +  1−αnb LP + CP + CD
 .
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Scenario 1: θˇ (cD)< θ (or, equivalently, "low" cD)
In this case, the additional litigation cost an alleged infringer has to incur to file an inva-
lidity counterclaim never prevents him from challenging the patent’s validity (when set-
tlement fails). We can then derive the equilibrium settlement amount S˜b and the corre-
sponding probability threshold θ˜ b = θˆ b(S˜b, cD) from the analysis of the non-bifurcated
system by replacing CD with CD + cD,
 
1−αnb LP with  1−αb LP , and αnb LD with
αb LD +
 
1−αb lD:
S˜b =
(  
αb LD +
 
1−αb lDθ − CP −  1−αb LP if θ − θ ≥ CD+CP+(1−αb)LPαb LD+(1−αb)lD
αbθ LD + CD otherwise
(5)
and
θ˜ b =
(
θ − CP+CD+cD+(1−αb)LP
αb LD+(1−αb)lD if θ − θ ≥
CD+CP+(1−αb)LP
αb LD+(1−αb)lD
θ otherwise
(6)
We can now derive the effects of bifurcation on settlement from the comparison of the
equilibrium outcomes under both systems. For the sake of exposition, we focus on the
set of parameters leading to interior solutions under both systems, i.e.,
θ − θ ≥ CD + CP + cD +
 
1−αb LP
min (αnb LD,αb LD + (1−αb) lD)
Effect of bifurcation on the settlement amount: The equilibrium settlement amount
under the non-bifurcated system can be written as
S˜nb = Anbθ −∆nbP
where
Anb ≡ αnb LD and ∆nbP ≡ CP +
 
1−αnb LP
The term Anb measures the extent of adverse selection under the non-bifurcated system:
it becomes more costly for the patent holder to separate defendant types when Anb
increases. To see why, notice that the informational rent that a patent holder leaves to
defendants that have a type θ above the borderline type θˆ nb (S) is
 
αnbθ LD + CD
− S,
which is increasing in Anb.
In order to interpret ∆nbP , note first that, under the non-bifurcated system, settle-
ment generates joint surplus
∆nb ≡ CP +
 
1−αnb LP + CD
for the patent holder and the alleged infringer. The term ∆nbP is the part of this joint
surplus captured by the patent holder, gross of the settlement amount.
Similarly, we can write the equilibrium settlement amount under the bifurcated
system as
S˜b = Abθ −∆bP
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where
Ab ≡ αb LD +
 
1−αb lD and ∆bP ≡ CP +  1−αb LP
are the counterparts of Anb and ∆nbP under the bifurcated system. Denote also
∆b ≡ CP +
 
1−αnb LP + CD + cD
the counterpart of∆nb under the bifurcated system (when the alleged infringer files an
invalidity couterclaim whenever settlement fails, as in the current scenario).
Thus,
S˜b − S˜nb =  Ab − Anbθ −  ∆bP −∆nbP  (7)
This shows that the comparison of the equilibrium settlement amounts under the two
systems depends on the following two effects:
a. The effect of bifurcation on the extent of adverse selection, which is captured
by Ab − Anb. An increase (decrease) in the extent of adverse selection has a posi-
tive (negative) effect on the settlement amount. The intuition behind this is that
more adverse selection provides the patent holder with larger incentives to limit
the informational rent left to the alleged infringer types that accept to settle by
increasing the settlement amount that he requests.
b. The effect of bifurcation on the part of the joint surplus from settlement captured
by the patent holder (gross of the settlement amount). Note that the sign of this
effect is always positive:
∆bP −∆nbP =
 
αnb −αb LP ≥ 0
because the probability that the patent is invalidated when challenged is higher
under the bifurcated system. This means that, for a given settlement amount, the
patent holder’s part of the surplus from settlement under the bifurcated system
is greater than its counterpart under the non-bifurcated system. This effect of
bifurcation increases the patent holder’s incentives to make a less demanding
offer in order to increase the probability of reaching a settlement.
Therefore, we need to distinguish between two cases:
1. If Ab ≤ Anb then both effects lead to a decrease of the settlement amount and,
therefore, the overall effect of bifurcation on the settlement amount is negative.
2. If Ab > Anb then the effect of bifurcation on adverse selection affects positively the
settlement amount while the effect of bifurcation on the part of the joint surplus
from settlement captured by the patent holder affects negatively the settlement
amount. Therefore, the overall effect of bifurcation is ambiguous in this case.
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Effect of bifurcation on the settlement rate: Denote r˜ b ≡ θ−θ˜ b
θ−θ the equilibrium set-
tlement rate under the bifurcated system and r˜nb ≡ θ−θ˜ nb
θ−θ its counterpart under the
non-bifurcated system . From (4) and (6) it follows that
r˜nb =
1
θ − θ
∆nb
Anb
and
r˜ b =
1
θ − θ
∆b
Ab
Therefore,
r˜ b
r˜nb
=
∆b
∆nb
Ab
Anb
(8)
Thus, the effect of bifurcation on the settlement rate depends on its effect on the
joint surplus from settlement (how ∆
b
∆nb
compares to 1) and its effect on the extent of
adverse selection (i.e., how A
b
Anb compares to 1).
Note first that the joint surplus generated by a settlement is always greater under
the bifurcated system than under the non-bifurcated system:
∆b
∆nb
− 1 = ∆b −∆nb
∆nb
=
 
αnb −αb LP + cD
∆nb
≥ 0
The reason for this is that bifurcation induces a higher expected loss from invalidation
for the patent holder and higher litigation costs for the alleged infringer. This increase
in the joint surplus from settlement increases the parties’ incentives to settle, which
explains why it has a positive effect on the settlement rate.
Consider now the effect of adverse selection on the settlement rate. As discussed
before, an increase in the latter provides the patent holder with incentives to increase
the amount requested in the settlement offer. This leads to a lower settlement rate, and
is consistent with the idea that an increase in adverse selection has generally a negative
impact on efficiency.29 This is why an increase (decrease) in adverse selection due to
bifurcation, i.e. A
b
Anb > 1 (
Ab
Anb < 1) has a negative (resp. positive) effect on the ratio of
settlemet rates r˜
b
r˜nb .
From the discussion above it follows that we need to distinguish again between the
same two cases as before:
1. If Ab ≤ Anb then bifurcation has a positive effect on the settlement rate: it in-
creases the joint surplus from settlement and decreases the extent of adverse
selection.
29In our context, reaching a settlement is an efficient outcome and an increase in the extent of adverse
selection leads to a decrease in the probability of this event.
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2. If Ab > Anb then bifurcation has an ambiguous effect on the settlement rate: it
increases the joint surplus from settlement but also increases the extent of adverse
selection.
Scenario 2: θˇ (cD)≥ θ (or, equivalently, "high" cD)
In this (other polar) simple scenario, the patent’s validity is never challenged if the
settlement attempt fails. We can therefore derive the equilibrium settlement amount S˜b
and the corresponding probability threshold θ˜ b from the analysis of the non-bifurcated
system by replacing αnb with 1 in (3) and (4):
S˜b =

LDθ − CP if θ − θ ≥ CD+CPLD
θ LD + CD otherwise
and
θ˜ b =

θ − CP+CDLD if θ − θ ≥ CD+CPLD
θ otherwise
For the sake of exposition, let us focus again on the set of parameters leading to interior
solutions under both systems.
In the current scenario, the extent of adverse selection under the bifurcated system
is
Ab = LD
and the joint surplus from settlement and the part of this surplus captured by the patent
holder (gross of the settlement amount) are respectively given by
∆b = CP + CD
and
∆bP = CP
Comparing these with their counterparts under the non-bifurcated system shows that,
in this scenario, bifurcation increases the extent of adverse selection (Ab ≥ Anb), de-
creases the joint surplus from settlement (∆b ≤ ∆nb), and decreases the part of the
joint surplus from settlement captured by the patent holder (∆bP ≤ ∆nbP ). Then, from
(7) and (8) it follows that bifurcation leads unambiguously to an increase in the equi-
librium settlement amount (S˜b ≥ S˜nb) and a decrease in the settlement rate (r˜ b ≤ r˜nb).
The reason for this finding is the same as in Scenario 1 (and so is the associated intu-
ition): the settlement amount is positively affected by the extent of adverse selection
and negatively affected by the part of the joint surplus from settlement captured by the
patent holder (gross of the settlement amount), while the settlement rate is positively
affected by the joint surplus from settlement and negatively affected by the extent of
adverse selection.
The next proposition summarizes the results derived under the two scenarios consid-
ered above.
Proposition 3. X
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1. If the additional cost of filing a validity challenge under the bifurcated system is
sufficiently low (θˇ (cD)< θ) and bifurcation decreases the extent of adverse selection
(αb LD+
 
1−αb lD ≤ αnb LD) then bifurcation has a negative effect on the settlement
amount and a positive effect on the settlement rate.
2. If the additional cost of filing a validity challenge under the bifurcated system is
sufficiently low (θˇ (cD)< θ), and bifurcation increases the extent of adverse selection
(αb LD +
 
1−αb lD > αnb LD) then bifurcation has an ambiguous effect on both the
settlement amount and the settlement rate.
3. If the additional cost of filing a validity challenge under the bifurcated system is
sufficiently high (θˇ (cD)≥ θ) then bifurcation has a positive effect on the settlement
amount and a negative effect on the settlement rate.
This proposition provides testable predictions and shows that the magnitude of the
additional cost of filing a validity challenge under the bifurcated system can be (qualita-
tively) inferred from empirical findings about the effect of bifurcation on the settlement
rate.
3.6 Extension: Timing
In another extension, presented in online appendix D, we consider a variant of our set-
ting in which the timeline and, in particular, the injunction gap are explicitly modeled.
We model the time that elapses between the actions of the following (strategic and
non-strategic) players: the court(s), the patent holder, the alleged infringer and a third
firm that considers entering the market before the patent expires (but will only do so if
the patent is invalidated).
If the court finds that the patent is valid and infringed, it makes the infringer pay
damages to the the patent holder. We suppose that these damages are equal to the loss
incurred by the patent holder because the alleged infringer was active in the output
market. Moreover, when the court finds the patent to be valid and infringed, it imposes
an injunction against the alleged infringer who has then to stay out of the market until
the patent expires.
Under the bifurcated system, if the patent is found invalid after being found in-
fringed, the infringer can re-enter the market right after the invalidity decision. More-
over, he can recover the damages he had to pay to the patent holder after the judgment
regarding the infringement issue, and can claim for compensation for the fact that he
wrongly faced an injunction between the two court judgments. To capture the loss
(benefit) that the injunction gap induces for the alleged infringer (patent holder) we
assume that the alleged infringer is not fully compensated for the loss incurred between
the two court judgments.
We show in online appendix D that the patent holder’s and alleged infringer’s payoffs
in this model are a special case of the reduced-form payoffs in our baseline model. On
the one hand, this shows that all the results we derived in our basic setting carry over to
this extension, and, on the other hand, it provides micro-foundations for the reduced-
form payoffs of the baseline model.
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4 Data
The focus of our empirical analysis is on the German bifurcated litigation system. How-
ever, our comparison of the bifurcated with the non-bifurcated system also relies on U.K.
litigation data. In this section we discuss our data for both jurisdictions.
4.1 Data Sources
Germany: Regional Courts – Infringement
We collected data on infringement actions directly from the three regional courts that
deal with the majority of patent infringement cases in Germany: the Regional Courts of
Düsseldorf, Mannheim, and Munich I. We obtained detailed information on proceedings
filed during the time period 2000 to 2008. This provides us with a nine-year window but
also minimizes the number of cases that were still pending during the data collection.30
The information extracted for each case concerns procedural aspects, the identity of
the litigants and their legal representatives, and the patents at issue. The data include
information on the names and addresses of the plaintiffs and defendants, which allowed
us to match corporate litigants to firm-level databases, including Bureau van Dijk’s
ORBIS, Compustat and THOMSON One.
With the patent application (or publication) numbers referenced in the case files,
we retrieved detailed information on the litigated patents from EPO’s Patstat.31 Patstat
provides us with detailed information on patent characteristics, such as application and
publication dates, patent classes, etc. On basis of the patent numbers we constructed
the respective patent families to obtain other European national as well as EP equiva-
lents in order to identify cases where a particular patent dispute spreads across multiple
national jurisdictions.
Germany: Federal Patent Court – Invalidity
We also have information on invalidity proceedings before the BPatG and its appeal
court, the BGH. Both courts publish all decisions on validity since 2000 on their web-
sites. We also obtained information on the filing date as well as withdrawn actions in
30Data collection started in Mannheim in spring 2010, in Munich in December 2010 and in Düsseldorf
in December 2011. On average seven junior lawyers (Referendare) were employed as research assistants
at each court to record the data directly from the dockets. Most research assistants had already passed
the qualifying examination that authorizes them to practice law in Germany. They also received specific
training for the data collection. Because case files are stored at the courts only in paper format, our
research assistants had to digitize the relevant information directly at the regional courts. To retrieve all
information in a systematic manner, we created a common data template. To address potential problems
originating from pending cases, we revisited the court records at the Regional Court Düsseldorf in June
2013. In addition, over the past few years, German courts have increasingly made decisions available
online. We repeatedly screened the online case repositories and complemented our records where pos-
sible. As a result, there are only 33 cases (< 1%) in our dataset where the first instance infringement
decision is still unknown to us and which we therefore drop from our sample.
31We use the Patstat version October 2015.
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both instances from the register of the German Patent and Trademark Office. This al-
lowed us to construct the course of the invalidity proceedings without having to access
the case files at the courts.
U.K.: PHC and PCC/IPEC – Infringement and Invalidity
For the U.K., we have detailed data on the population of cases at the PHC, and the
PCC/IPEC. Data for the PHC are available for the period 2000-2013, whereas no IPEC
court records are available for cases filed prior to 2007.32 The PHC and IPEC data
for the period 2007-2013 were collected directly from physical PHC and IPEC court
records/files in 2014 and 2015.33 The PHC data for the earlier 2000-2006 period were
collected from a range of online sources.34 The U.K. court records contain detailed
information on both infringement claims and invalidity counterclaims, as well as case
outcomes. As for the German data, we matched the names of the parties involved to
firm-level databases (Bureau van Dijk’s FAME, Amadeus, and Compustat) and retrieved
detailed information from Patstat on the litigated patents.
EPO and DPMA – Opposition
We have data on any prior or parallel opposition of the patents involved in an infringe-
ment action. For DE patents we have information on the opposition proceeding, i.e. the
opposition’s filing and end dates as well as outcome, from the register of the DPMA.
We constructed data on oppositions at the EPO based on legal status information from
Patstat covering 1981 to 2012. In contrast to the data from the DPMA, the data for
oppositions at the EPO have information on the identity of the opponent, that is, the
party filing the opposition. We added information on any opposition to the patents in-
volved in an infringement proceeding to identify parallel invalidity proceedings in form
of oppositions and to construct each patent’s history of validity challenges.
4.2 Sample Description
Germany
The patent litigation actions collected at the Regional Courts of Mannheim, Düssel-
dorf, and Munich cover around 90% of all patent infringement cases during the period
2000 to 2008.35 We drop cases from our dataset that involve a patent, but that are not
32Estimates based on anonymized data for 2005/06 suggest that cases at the PCC accounted for only
around 20% of all patent cases in the U.K. during the 2000-2006 period (Cremers et al., 2016). Also,
case counts at the PCC were very low in absolute terms compared to the period 2007-2013 for which we
have data.
33The data collection and assembly is described in detail in Helmers et al. (2015).
34To ensure completeness of our records, we relied on the Court Diary which lists all cases scheduled
for a hearing or application, including a case management conference which is usually the first step in
the litigation process. The data collection is described in detail in Helmers and McDonagh (2012).
35We estimate that roughly half of the remaining 10% of cases are spread over the other nine regional
courts. However, these courts are of minor importance and reputation. The possibility to choose a litiga-
tion venue might create incentives for forum shopping (Gaessler, 2016). In our setting forum shopping
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directly concerned with infringement.36 We also drop cases involving utility models
because the bifurcation principle only applies to invention patents. Furthermore, to
avoid misinterpretation of case outcomes, we also remove a small number of negative
declaratory actions and cases where the court decides only on issues regarding the en-
forcement of a previous judgment (e.g. the amount of damages granted). The resulting
sample contains 3,279 patent infringement cases. As some actions are filed on the basis
of more than one patent, our sample contains 3,600 patent-case observations.37
For the time period 2000 to 2008 our data count 1,822 invalidity actions filed at
the Federal Patent Court.38
U.K.
For the U.K., our data cover the population of patent cases between 2007 and 2013.
For 2000-2006 we estimate that our data contain around 80% of disputes. As in the
German data, we drop cases that are not directly concerned with infringement as well
as those on negative declaratory actions. We also drop cases that are withdrawn or
settled within 90 days counting from the filing date of the claim form as these cases are
not relevant for our analysis.39 The resulting sample contains 299 patent infringement
cases involving 377 different patents. As several actions are filed on the basis of more
than one patent, our sample contains 461 patent-case observations.
5 Effects of Bifurcation
In this section, we first provide empirical evidence on the injunction gap in the bifur-
cated litigation system. We then analyze the likelihood of invalidity challenges and
settlements in the bifurcated and non-bifurcated systems.
might compound the effects of bifurcation, although it is unclear how important such an effect might be
given the strong concentration of litigation activity in only three regional courts.
36This includes employee invention disputes, licensing and patent transfer disputes, as well as patent
arrogations and false marking.
37For the empirical analysis in Section 5.2, we further exclude cases that end with a judgment in the
first 120 days because they represent decisions on preliminary injunctions without a subsequent main
proceeding. Since our focus lies on invalidity actions as a response to an infringement allegation, we also
exclude cases with a pending opposition proceeding throughout the whole infringement case. For the
empirical analysis in Section 5.3, the sample is further reduced by excluding cases that end in settlement
after a validity challenge to remain consistent with our theoretical model.
38As parallel invalidity proceedings may be filed either before or after this time frame, we identified
all invalidity actions filed against patents involved in an infringement proceeding and added these to our
data. For more details and a breakdown of court cases by court see Cremers et al. (2016).
39These are generally cases where the defendant did not even file an initial defense, i.e. the only action
that occurred is the filing of the claim form. This usually happens when a defendant does not respond
at all to the case, the plaintiff simply drops the case, or the parties settle immediately after the filing of
the claim form.
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5.1 Divergent decisions
We begin by assessing the frequency of cases where a patent was ‘invalid but infringed’
in the German litigation system. Such decisions are only possible in systems that sepa-
rate infringement and validity proceedings and depend on the temporal spread between
infringement and validity challenges. Figure A-3 in the online appendix shows that in
most cases the invalidity action followed its corresponding infringement action. As in-
validity proceedings take on average longer, too (see Figure A-4 in the online appendix),
the infringement decision is usually handed down first, despite the possibility to have
the infringement proceeding stayed. The (first instance) decision on validity is taken
on average 6.8 months after the (first instance) decision on infringement. This shows
that there is substantial scope for an injunction gap: if a patent is found to be infringed,
the patent holder has on average 6.8 months to enforce the patent even if the patent
is invalidated once the BPatG (invalidity) or DPMA and EPO (opposition) hand down
their decision.
Table 1 cross-tabulates the (first instance) infringement and invalidity outcomes for
all 1,248 parallel cases where the decision on infringement was handed down first.
The gray-shaded cells in Table 1 show that there is a sizeable number of cases where
the patent was first found to be infringed and later invalidated by the BPatG or the
DPMA/EPO. If we also consider cases where the patent was partly invalidated or in-
fringed, there is a total of 145 cases. For comparison, in only 69 cases patents that
were found to be (partly) infringed were upheld in the invalidity proceeding. This
means that slightly more than 11.6% of cases (including cases that settled) produce
divergent decisions – the patent is first found to be infringed but later invalidated.40 If
we focus on cases with a decision in both venues, the share increases to 41.3%.
Figure 2 shows the length of the injunction gap for the 145 cases with divergent
decisions. The figure distinguishes between invalidity decisions through the opposi-
tion divisions of the DPMA/EPO and the BPatG. The median injunction gap for cases in
which the infringed patent was eventually invalidated by the BPatG is about 14 months.
Hence, parties that have won the infringement case have little over a year to enforce a
patent that should not have been granted in the first place.41 The length of the injunc-
tion gap is significantly longer for cases in which the patent was invalidated through
opposition procedures. The median is 34 months. As shown in Figure 2, the main rea-
son for this is that there are a considerable number of opposition proceedings that take
a lot longer to reach a final decision than invalidity proceedings at the BPatG.
As explained in Section 2, the judgment by the infringement court is (preliminar-
ily) enforceable despite a pending decision on validity. The only way to prevent an
injunction from taking binding effect is to appeal the judgment. In fact, we observe an
appeal rate of 57.9% for cases with a parallel invalidity proceeding compared to 26.2%
for cases with no parallel invalidity proceeding.42 An assessment of final outcomes of
40Figure A-5 in the online appendix shows the occurrence of divergent decisions over time.
41Considering that appellate invalidity proceedings take several years, the actual injunction gap until
the decision on the patent’s invalidity is binding may be considerably longer.
42This hints at the possibility that the appeal rate is higher in a bifurcated system than in a non-
bifurcated system. An appeal to an infringement decision may be useful – regardless of its prospects of
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Table 1: Comparing outcomes of infringement and invalidity proceedings where in-
fringement was decided first
Outcome parallel invalidity proceeding
Outcome LG valid partly
invalid
invalid withdrawn Total
infringed 58 50 55 133 296
43.6% 23.9% 25.0% 19.4% 23.7%
partly infringed 21 21 19 51 112
15.8% 10.0% 8.6% 7.4% 9.0%
not infringed 23 46 58 88 215
17.3% 22.0% 26.4% 12.8% 17.2%
settlement 31 92 88 414 625
23.3% 44.0% 40.0% 60.3% 50.1%
Total 133 209 220 686 1248
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Notes: Dark gray-shaded area shows clear divergent decisions. Light gray-shaded area shows presumed divergent decisions. The
sample consists of all infringement proceedings with a parallel invalidity proceeding and where the first instance infringement
outcome is first. In case of multiple invalidity decisions, the fastest decision is chosen. The unit of observation is at the patent in
the infringement proceedings.
Figure 2: Length of injunction gap for divergent decisions
0
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Revocation (median) Opposition (median)
Source: own data and calculation
Notes: The figure shows all divergent decisions regardless of whether parties have (preliminarily) enforced the infringement
judgment.
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cases with divergent decisions (Table A-2 in the online appendix) reveals that in 42.8%
of cases with divergent decisions in first instance, the divergent decision is upheld upon
appeal.
Table 2 shows a comparison of case-, litigant-, and patent-level characteristics be-
tween defendants in infringement cases that were subject to divergent decisions and
all other cases with ‘non-divergent’ outcomes. The litigation value does not differ sig-
nificantly between divergent and non-divergent decisions, that is, there is no evidence
for disproportionately many low-value cases ending up in an injunction gap. That said,
we find that validity challenges in cases with divergent decisions are filed on average
three months later than in cases with non-divergent decisions. This shows that the
temporal separation of infringement and invalidity proceedings contributes to diver-
gent outcomes. When we look at the size of the defendants in the infringement cases
in the two groups, we find slightly more small firms in the divergent decision group on
the one hand, and more large firms in the non-divergent decision group on the other.
5.2 Validity challenges
About 37.8% of infringement cases (counted at the patent-level) in Germany are asso-
ciated with an invalidity action. This figure is low compared to litigation systems where
infringement and invalidity are decided simultaneously in the same proceeding. In fact,
in the U.K. we find counterclaims for invalidity in 71.6% of infringement cases. Table
A-4 in the online appendix shows the share of infringement cases where validity was
challenged and breaks it down by technology area of the patent in question. The rate
of validity challenges is consistently nearly twice as large in the U.K. as it is in Germany
across all technology areas.
The model in Section 3 suggested that in a bifurcated system alleged infringers
are less likely to challenge validity due to the possibility of an injunction gap and the
additional cost of initiating and conducting separate invalidity proceedings. To test
Prediction 1 empirically, we compare directly the propensity that an alleged infringer
files an invalidity action in Germany vs. the U.K. The model also predicted that in a bi-
furcated system, in particular more resource-constrained firms are less likely to contest
validity. To test Prediction 2, we distinguish between four size categories: micro, small,
medium and large.43 We ask whether micro-sized corporate and individual defendants
are less likely to challenge validity at the BPatG and compare this with the U.K. We
estimate the following discrete choice specification:
invalpit = α0 +βukpit +
∑
s
γssizei t +
∑
s
δs[sizei t × ukpit]+ θX pit +
∑
t
ηt Dt + εpit (9)
where invalpit is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the alleged infringer i
challenged validity of patent p in year t. ukpit denotes a dummy variable that is equal
success – in order to delay an injunction while the decision on validity is still pending.
43The size categories are defined according to the EU definition, which relies on information on a firm’s
number of employees, turnover, and total assets.
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Table 2: Comparison of alleged infringers by decision
Decision type
Non-divergent Divergent
Variables Mean Mean SE mean
diff.
Signif.
Alleged infringer
Micro 0.11 0.12 0.028
Small 0.15 0.23 0.032 ∗∗
Medium 0.21 0.27 0.037
Large 0.52 0.39 0.044 ∗∗∗
Germany 0.82 0.88 0.033 ∗
Europe (excl. Germany) 0.13 0.10 0.029
World (excl. Europe) 0.05 0.02 0.019 ∗
Top legal representative 0.55 0.61 0.044
Proceeding
Litigation value (in th €) 1133.44 986.43 229.887
Lag of invalidity action (in months) 4.14 6.57 0.916 ∗∗∗
Lag of opposition (in months) -6.70 -6.53 1.535
Technological area
Electrical engineering 0.30 0.14 0.039 ∗∗∗
Instruments 0.12 0.20 0.029 ∗∗∗
Chemistry 0.15 0.23 0.033 ∗∗
Mechanical engineering 0.29 0.30 0.040
Other 0.14 0.13 0.031
Observations 1102 145
Notes: The sample consists of all infringement proceedings with parallel invalidity proceedings or oppositions regardless of the
timing of the decisions. The unit of observation is at the patent in each infringement proceeding. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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to one if a case was litigated in the U.K., sizei t are three dummy variables for the dif-
ferent company size categories (small, medium, and large) where the omitted category
is micro-sized firms. sizei t × ukpit is the interaction of size categories and the U.K.
dummy variable. The specification includes a number of patent-, case-, and litigant-
characteristics among the regressors X pit (for a detailed definition of these variables
see online appendix E). The regressions also include year, patent technology class, and
court dummies. We estimate the specification in (9) using a probit model and cluster
standard errors at the case-level. Summary statistics are shown in Table A-3 in the
online appendix.
Table 3 shows the results when we focus on patent cases in Germany. As we move
from left (column 1) to right (column 4), we add additional variables at the defendant-,
plaintiff-, patent-, and case-level. All specifications include year and technology effects
and a number of patent characteristics. The results for our preferred specification in
column 4 show that medium-sized and large firms are about 7% and 11% respectively
more likely to file an invalidity action at the BPatG than micro-sized alleged infringers.
This suggests that smaller defendants in infringement proceedings are less likely to
challenge the validity of the patent at issue. In contrast, there is no evidence that the
size of the plaintiff in the infringement proceedings, that is the patent holder, plays
any role in the decision to challenge the patent’s validity. This supports the view (and
Prediction 2 of our model) that the decision not to file a parallel action at the BPatG is
at least partly determined by resource constraints on the alleged infringer’s side.
Next, we turn to our cross-jurisdictional comparison of the incidence of a separate
invalidity action at the BPatG in Germany with that of an invalidity counterclaim in the
U.K. Columns 1 and 2 in Table 4 show the results for Germany and the U.K. individ-
ually (the specification differs slightly form that used in Table 3 because a number of
variables are not available in the U.K. dataset).44 The estimates for the U.K. shown in
Column 2 indicate that there is no statistically significant difference in the propensity to
challenge validity through a counterclaim across firms in the different size groups in the
U.K. Micro-sized companies are no less likely to challenge validity than firms in any of
the other three size categories (see also Table A-4 in the online appendix for descriptive
evidence). In columns 3 and 4 we pool the German and U.K. data to estimate speci-
fication (9). First, the U.K. dummy variable is statistically highly significant, positive,
and large in magnitude. This clearly indicates that alleged infringers are more likely
(around 55%) to challenge validity in infringement proceedings in the non-bifurcated
relative to the bifurcated system. This confirms Prediction 1 of our theoretical model.
Moreover, when we look at the interaction of the U.K. dummy with the firm-size dum-
mies, we see that the signs are all negative and in case of the small company size
category even statistically significant. This confirms the findings from column 2 that
micro-sized companies are not less likely to challenge validity in the U.K. as opposed
to the German bifurcated system adding further evidence in support of Prediction 2.
The results in Tables 3 and 4, therefore, provide strong evidence in favor of a
‘validity-challenge deterrence’ effect of bifurcation as suggested by our model. Alleged
infringers are generally less likely to challenge validity in the bifurcated system com-
44Alternative specifications for the U.K. can be found in Table A-5 in the online appendix.
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Table 3: Probit model results: incidence of invalidity action (DE)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Validity challenge Validity challenge Validity challenge Validity challenge
Alleged infringer
Small (d) 0.066 (0.044) 0.042 (0.045) 0.038 (0.045) 0.036 (0.045)
Medium (d) 0.101∗∗ (0.040) 0.080∗ (0.041) 0.077∗ (0.042) 0.075∗ (0.042)
Large (d) 0.167∗∗∗ (0.037) 0.134∗∗∗ (0.039) 0.131∗∗∗ (0.039) 0.110∗∗∗ (0.040)
Europe (excl. Germany) (d) −0.100∗∗∗ (0.026) −0.094∗∗∗ (0.026) −0.083∗∗∗ (0.027)
World (excl. Europe) (d) −0.223∗∗∗ (0.040) −0.227∗∗∗ (0.039) −0.207∗∗∗ (0.041)
Number of parties −0.004 (0.021)
Multinational group (d) 0.106∗∗∗ (0.037)
Top legal representative (d) 0.148∗∗∗ (0.022)
Patent holder
Non-practicing entity (d) −0.043 (0.038) −0.035 (0.038) −0.029 (0.039)
Small (d) −0.011 (0.049) −0.009 (0.049) −0.013 (0.050)
Medium (d) −0.033 (0.046) −0.021 (0.047) −0.023 (0.047)
Large (d) −0.009 (0.044) −0.002 (0.044) −0.015 (0.044)
Europe (excl. Germany) (d) 0.032 (0.028) 0.040 (0.028) 0.026 (0.028)
World (excl. Europe) (d) −0.060∗ (0.035) −0.056 (0.035) −0.056 (0.035)
Top legal representative (d) 0.006 (0.028)
Invalidity history
Patent solidified (opp. proc.) (d) 0.051∗ (0.029) 0.039 (0.030)
Patent challenged (rev. proc.) (d) −0.146∗∗∗ (0.039) −0.129∗∗∗ (0.041)
Patent solidified (rev. proc.) (d) −0.022 (0.080) −0.040 (0.081)
Proceeding
Parallel opposition proceeding (d) −0.231∗∗∗ (0.033) −0.231∗∗∗ (0.033) −0.243∗∗∗ (0.032)
Litigation value (in th €, log) 0.046∗∗∗ (0.011) 0.044∗∗∗ (0.011) 0.039∗∗∗ (0.011)
Multi-jurisdictional litigation (d) 0.091 (0.062)
Controls
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Technology effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Court effects No Yes Yes Yes
Patent characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.041 0.079 0.079 0.099
Observations 2,529 2,529 2,529 2,529
Marginal effects reported; Case-clustered standard errors in parentheses;
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: The sample consists of all infringement proceedings without judgment/settlement during the first 120 days counting from
the filing date of the case. The dependent variable is equal to one if the defendant challenged validity in parallel proceedings at
the BPatG. The unit of observation is at the patent-case-level. Baseline litigant size: micro. Baseline litigant residence: Germany.
Patent characteristics not reported in the table include patent age (in years), patent age (in years, squared), patent and non-patent
backward citations, forward citations (in first 3 years), number of International Patent Classification (IPC) subclasses, patent family
size, grant lag (diff. from mean in months), indicators for international PCT applications, EP patents, and accelerated examination.
Technology effects include indicators for each main technology area (electrical engineering, instruments, chemistry, mechanical
engineering, other). Court effects include indicators for each regional court.
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Table 4: Probit model results: incidence of validity challenges (DE-UK comparison)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DE only UK only DE+UK DE+UK
Validity challenge Validity challenge Validity challenge Validity challenge
Jurisdiction
UK (d) 0.581∗∗∗ (0.046) 0.551∗∗∗ (0.082)
Alleged infringer
Small (d) 0.035 (0.044) −0.164 (0.138) 0.026 (0.042) 0.036 (0.045)
Medium (d) 0.078∗ (0.041) 0.010 (0.102) 0.073∗ (0.040) 0.081∗ (0.042)
Large (d) 0.116∗∗∗ (0.039) −0.027 (0.078) 0.116∗∗∗ (0.037) 0.121∗∗∗ (0.040)
Europe (excl. Germany) (d) −0.099∗∗∗ (0.026) 0.178∗∗∗ (0.041) −0.091∗∗∗ (0.027) −0.099∗∗∗ (0.027)
World (excl. Europe) (d) −0.209∗∗∗ (0.041) −0.468∗∗ (0.196) −0.251∗∗∗ (0.039) −0.227∗∗∗ (0.046)
Top legal representative (d) 0.157∗∗∗ (0.022) 0.003 (0.061) 0.148∗∗∗ (0.022) 0.150∗∗∗ (0.022)
Alleged infringer x UK
Small (d) −0.205∗∗ (0.098)
Medium (d) −0.015 (0.152)
Large (d) −0.079 (0.106)
Europe (excl. domestic) (d) 0.350∗∗ (0.158)
World (excl. Europe) (d) −0.206∗ (0.117)
Patent holder
Non-practicing entity (d) −0.031 (0.038) −0.178 (0.109) −0.029 (0.037) −0.048 (0.038)
Small (d) −0.014 (0.049) 0.041 (0.094) 0.019 (0.048) −0.013 (0.050)
Medium (d) −0.034 (0.046) 0.149∗∗∗ (0.057) −0.004 (0.045) −0.041 (0.047)
Large (d) −0.016 (0.044) 0.334∗∗∗ (0.119) 0.013 (0.041) −0.020 (0.044)
Europe (excl. Germany) (d) 0.025 (0.028) −0.257∗∗ (0.102) 0.014 (0.027) 0.033 (0.029)
World (excl. Europe) (d) −0.049 (0.035) 0.063 (0.079) −0.024 (0.034) −0.042 (0.036)
Top legal representative (d) 0.005 (0.028) −0.222∗∗∗ (0.074) −0.016 (0.027) −0.014 (0.028)
Patent holder x UK
Small (d) 0.219 (0.170)
Medium (d) 0.375∗∗∗ (0.132)
Large (d) 0.285∗∗ (0.118)
Europe (excl. domestic) (d) −0.264∗∗∗ (0.061)
World (excl. Europe) (d) 0.098 (0.125)
Invalidity history
Patent solidified (opp. proc.) (d) 0.041 (0.029) 0.046 (0.085) 0.053∗ (0.030) 0.055∗ (0.030)
Proceeding
Parallel opposition proceeding (d) −0.231∗∗∗ (0.034) 0.137∗∗∗ (0.048) −0.170∗∗∗ (0.036) −0.175∗∗∗ (0.037)
Litigation value (in th €, log) 0.042∗∗∗ (0.011) −0.005 (0.031) 0.037∗∗∗ (0.010) 0.040∗∗∗ (0.011)
Controls
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Technology effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Court effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Patent characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.091 0.391 0.123 0.131
Observations 2,529 461 2,990 2,990
Marginal effects reported; Standard errors in parentheses;
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: The DE (UK) sample consists of all infringement proceedings without settlement/judgment during the first 120 (90) days
counting from the filing date of the case. The dependent variable is equal to one if the defendant challenged validity – DE: in
parallel proceedings at the BPatG – UK: through an invalidity counterclaim in the same proceedings. The unit of observation
is at the patent-case-level. UK cases with multiple patents are weighted to account for oversampling. Baseline litigant size:
micro. Baseline litigant residence: domestic (Germany/UK). Patent characteristics not reported in the table include patent age
(in years), patent age (in years, squared), patent and non-patent backward citations, forward citations (in first 3 years), number
of International Patent Classification (IPC) subclasses, patent family size, grant lag (diff. from mean in months), indicators for
international PCT applications, EP patents, and accelerated examination. Technology effects include indicators for each main
technology area (electrical engineering, instruments, chemistry, mechanical engineering, other). Court effects include indicators
for each German and U.K. court.
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pared to the non-bifurcated system. Moreover, more resource-constrained firms are less
likely to file an invalidity action in response to an infringement claim in the bifurcated
system. This also implies that the 11.6% of ‘invalid but infringed’ cases shown in Section
5.1 in the German system are downward biased. Fewer patents are in fact invalidated
than in the absence of the additional costs engendered by bifurcation. This also con-
tributes to the strong presumption of validity in a litigation system where infringement
is decided first in a self-reinforcing way.
5.3 Settlement
The extension of our model looked at the impact of bifurcation on settlement amounts
and rates. Settlement amounts are private information and usually not disclosed in
court records. Hence we focus on the incidence of settlements, which observe in our
data. The model in Section 3.5 produced ambiguous predictions regarding the propen-
sity to settle in a bifurcated system compared to the non-bifurcated system (Proposition
3). Hence, we rely on the data to reveal which one of the different effects of bifurcation
dominates. To do this, we again compare directly the outcomes of infringement cases in
Germany with the U.K. We also test for differences in settlement behavior across firm-
size groups because our model suggests that the additional costs involved in a validity
challenge in the bifurcated system are one of determinants of settlements. Hence, we
estimate the analogue to specification (9):
settlepit = α0 +βukpit +
∑
s
γssizei t +
∑
s
δs[sizei t ×ukpit]+θX pit +
∑
t
ηt Dt +εpit (10)
where settlepit is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the case was settled.
Note that our sample of cases has changed compared to specification (9), because we
drop all cases that settled after an invalidity action was filed. Following the structure
of our theoretical model, we are interested in the incidence of settlement before the
defendant decides to challenge validity. All other variables remain unaltered compared
to specification (9). We also estimate the specification in (10) using a probit model and
cluster standard errors at the case-level. Summary statistics are shown in Table A-3 in
the online appendix.
Table 5 shows the results for Germany. The estimates show that all marginal effects
for the set of size dummies are positive and statistically significantly different from zero
in the case of medium-sized and large firms, although in the latter case only marginally
so in column 4. This indicates that smaller companies are less likely to settle compared
to larger companies.
Turning to the comparison between Germany and the U.K. in Table 6, we find first
of all in columns 3 and 4 a statistically highly significant and negative marginal effect
for the U.K. dummy variable, which means that parties have a lower propensity to set-
tle in the U.K. This empirical finding is in line with the theoretical predictions derived
under Scenario 1 (i.e. "low" cD) and is inconsistent with those derived under Scenario
2 (i.e. "high" cD). The fact that our empirical analysis rejects Scenario 2 is not surpris-
ing since, in that scenario, the additional cost of filing a validity challenge under the
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Table 5: Probit model results: incidence of settlement (DE)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Case settled Case settled Case settled Case settled
Alleged infringer
Small (d) 0.039 (0.047) 0.056 (0.048) 0.057 (0.048) 0.052 (0.048)
Medium (d) 0.089∗ (0.043) 0.117∗∗ (0.045) 0.116∗∗ (0.045) 0.117∗∗ (0.045)
Large (d) 0.028 (0.040) 0.073 (0.043) 0.072 (0.044) 0.088∗ (0.044)
Europe (excl. Germany) (d) 0.208∗∗∗ (0.031) 0.205∗∗∗ (0.031) 0.195∗∗∗ (0.032)
World (excl. Europe) (d) 0.051 (0.057) 0.056 (0.058) 0.021 (0.058)
Number of parties −0.047 (0.033)
Multinational group (d) −0.098∗ (0.045)
Top legal representative (d) −0.145∗∗∗ (0.025)
Patent holder
Non-practicing entity (d) 0.108∗ (0.048) 0.105∗ (0.048) 0.087 (0.048)
Small (d) 0.117∗ (0.059) 0.116∗ (0.059) 0.105 (0.059)
Medium (d) 0.061 (0.057) 0.055 (0.057) 0.050 (0.057)
Large (d) 0.068 (0.052) 0.065 (0.052) 0.063 (0.051)
Europe (excl. Germany) (d) 0.035 (0.032) 0.030 (0.032) 0.042 (0.033)
World (excl. Europe) (d) 0.120∗∗ (0.039) 0.118∗∗ (0.040) 0.110∗∗ (0.040)
Top legal representative (d) 0.027 (0.033)
Invalidity history
Patent solidified (opp. proc.) (d) −0.032 (0.034) −0.013 (0.035)
Patent challenged (rev. proc.) (d) 0.055 (0.060) 0.045 (0.059)
Patent solidified (rev. proc.) (d) 0.031 (0.092) 0.043 (0.093)
Proceeding
Parallel opposition proceeding (d) 0.240∗∗∗ (0.054) 0.238∗∗∗ (0.055) 0.247∗∗∗ (0.056)
Litigation value (in th €, log) −0.026∗ (0.012) −0.026∗ (0.012) −0.022 (0.012)
Multi-jurisdictional litigation (d) 0.095 (0.072)
Controls
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Technology effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Court effects No Yes Yes Yes
Patent characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.067 0.104 0.106 0.122
Observations 2,020 2,020 2,020 2,020
Marginal effects reported; Standard errors in parentheses;
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: The sample consists of all infringement proceedings without judgment during the first 120 days or settlement after the filing
of an invalidity action. The dependent variable is equal to one if the case settled. The unit of observation is at the patent-case level.
Cases with multiple patents are weighted to account for oversampling. Baseline litigant size: micro. Baseline litigant residence:
Germany. Patent characteristics not reported in the table include patent age (in years), patent age (in years, squared), patent and
non-patent backward citations, forward citations (in first 3 years), number of number of International Patent Classification (IPC)
subclasses, patent family size, grant lag (diff. from mean in months), indicators for international PCT applications, EP patents, and
accelerated examination. Technology effects include indicators for each main technology area (electrical engineering, instruments,
chemistry, mechanical engineering, other). Court effects include indicators for each regional court.
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bifurcated system is sufficiently high for all validity challenges to be deterred, which is
not consistent with our data.
When we look at the marginal effects of the size dummies for the U.K. sample in
column 2, we find that the marginal effects of none of the size dummies are remotely
statistically significant (for more results for the U.K. sample see Table A-6 in the online
appendix). That is, there is no evidence that settlement behavior differs in the U.K.
across firms of different size which corroborates our findings from our analysis of the
incidence of invalidity challenges: the additional cost of filing an invalidity action is
less important in the U.K. and hence does not affect smaller firms disproportionately
more. When we look at the pooled sample in columns 3 and 4, the marginal effects of
the U.K.-size interaction terms for the alleged infringer are not statistically significant
while the medium and large firm size dummies on their own still are significant. Hence,
we see that in the U.K. (a) infringement cases are less likely to settle than in Germany
and (b) smaller firms are equally likely to settle as larger firms while in Germany smaller
firms are less likely to settle. These two findings in combination imply that the pattern
of settlement rates in Germany can at least partly be attributed to the additional cost
of filing a validity challenge in the bifurcated system.
6 Conclusion
Proponents of bifurcation argue that exclusive jurisdiction over patent validity offers
the advantage of specialization which should result in more legal certainty regarding
the validity of patents. The flipside of bifurcation is that it requires additional cost for a
validity challenge compared to a non-bifurcated system. Perhaps more surprisingly, our
empirical analysis also shows that bifurcation can generate additional costs for alleged
infringers (and benefits for patent holders) due to the relatively frequent occurrence of
an injunction gap. Our theoretical analysis shows that if we take these various effects
of bifurcation into account, the theoretical predictions are less clearcut than what one
might have expected. That is, ex ante it is in fact unclear whether the non-bifurcated
system is preferable over the bifurcated system. We find that the impact of bifurcation
on the patent holder’s propensity to sue for infringement is ambiguous; the impact of
bifurcation on both settlement amounts and rates is also ambiguous. Nevertheless, the
theory offers one clear prediction: bifurcation results in a ‘validity-challenge deterrence’
effect.
Our empirical analysis sheds more light on the comparison of bifurcated and non-
bifurcated systems. We find strong evidence that alleged infringers are less likely to
challenge the validity of an allegedly infringed patent in the bifurcated system every-
thing else equal. Since this effect is driven by the additional cost of filing and pursu-
ing an invalidity claim at a separate court, this effect affects smaller, more resource-
constrained companies more. Our data do not permit us to analyze the impact of this
‘validity-challenge deterrence’ effect on innovative activities, but it is possible that this
effect dampens incentives to innovate in particular among smaller firms. The lower
likelihood of facing an invalidity challenge might also increase the incentives to obtain
and enforce weak patents. We do not investigate such strategic effects of bifurcation
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here, but this is certainly a topic that deserves further scrutiny.
Our empirical analysis also reveals that parties are more likely to settle in a bifur-
cated system. This means that, for a given level of litigation intensity, litigation costs
are probably lower under a bifurcated system. However, a higher settlement rate also
implies that the uncertainty over the scope and validity of patents may be higher un-
der a bifurcated system, which may lead to a higher litigation intensity.45 Finally, a
bifurcated system arguably generates higher administrative costs compared to a non-
bifurcated system. From this perspective, training and appointing judges with a techni-
cal background while maintaining a unified court may be superior to using a bifurcated
system.
45The social costs resulting from the uncertainty over the validity of patents are discussed in Lemley
and Shapiro (2005), Farrell and Shapiro (2008) and Encaoua and Lefouili (2009).
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Table 6: Probit model results: incidence of settlement (DE-UK comparison)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DE only UK only DE+UK DE+UK
Case settled Case settled Case settled Case settled
Jurisdiction
UK (d) −0.391∗∗∗ (0.049) −0.303∗∗∗ (0.116)
Alleged infringer
Small (d) 0.051 (0.048) 0.251 (0.179) 0.048 (0.046) 0.053 (0.047)
Medium (d) 0.118∗∗∗ (0.045) 0.226 (0.209) 0.107∗∗ (0.043) 0.115∗∗∗ (0.044)
Large (d) 0.079∗ (0.044) −0.011 (0.107) 0.054 (0.042) 0.078∗ (0.043)
Europe (excl. Germany) (d) 0.209∗∗∗ (0.031) −0.179∗∗ (0.082) 0.185∗∗∗ (0.031) 0.201∗∗∗ (0.031)
World (excl. Europe) (d) 0.038 (0.058) 0.304 (0.190) 0.072 (0.055) 0.042 (0.057)
Top legal representative (d) −0.149∗∗∗ (0.025) 0.073 (0.095) −0.132∗∗∗ (0.024) −0.135∗∗∗ (0.024)
Alleged infringer x UK
Small (d) 0.228 (0.182)
Medium (d) 0.034 (0.217)
Large (d) −0.168 (0.125)
Europe (excl. domestic) (d) −0.375∗∗∗ (0.052)
World (excl. Europe) (d) 0.261 (0.169)
Patent holder
Non-practicing entity (d) 0.090∗ (0.048) −0.089 (0.087) 0.060 (0.045) 0.078∗ (0.045)
Small (d) 0.111∗ (0.059) −0.163 (0.102) 0.067 (0.055) 0.099∗ (0.057)
Medium (d) 0.060 (0.057) −0.148 (0.137) 0.011 (0.053) 0.045 (0.055)
Large (d) 0.067 (0.051) −0.123 (0.137) 0.027 (0.047) 0.053 (0.049)
Europe (excl. Germany) (d) 0.045 (0.033) 0.126 (0.109) 0.049 (0.030) 0.037 (0.032)
World (excl. Europe) (d) 0.111∗∗∗ (0.040) −0.044 (0.100) 0.088∗∗ (0.037) 0.103∗∗∗ (0.039)
Top legal representative (d) 0.029 (0.032) 0.021 (0.079) 0.026 (0.030) 0.025 (0.030)
Patent holder x UK
Small (d) −0.258∗ (0.145)
Medium (d) −0.309∗∗ (0.122)
Large (d) −0.182 (0.125)
Europe (excl. domestic) (d) 0.263∗∗ (0.125)
World (excl. Europe) (d) −0.103 (0.137)
Invalidity history
Patent solidified (opp. proc.) (d) −0.017 (0.035) −0.113 (0.088) −0.022 (0.033) −0.026 (0.033)
Proceeding
Parallel opposition proceeding (d) 0.245∗∗∗ (0.056) −0.221∗∗∗ (0.053) 0.164∗∗∗ (0.051) 0.165∗∗∗ (0.053)
Litigation value (in th €, log) −0.022∗ (0.012) 0.070∗∗∗ (0.024) −0.008 (0.011) −0.015 (0.012)
Controls
Year effects Yes No Yes Yes
Technology effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Court effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Patent characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.119 0.316 0.115 0.125
Observations 2,020 287 2,307 2,307
Marginal effects reported; Standard errors in parentheses;
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: The DE sample consists of all infringement proceedings without judgment during the first 120 days or settlement after
the filing of an invalidity action. The UK sample consists of all infringement proceedings without settlement after the filing
of a validity challenge counter-claim. The dependent variable is equal to one if the case settled. The unit of observation is
at the patent-case-level. Cases with multiple patents are weighted to account for oversampling. Baseline litigant size: micro.
Baseline litigant residence: domestic (Germany/U.K.). Patent characteristics not reported in the table include patent age (in
years), patent age (in years, squared), patent and non-patent backward citations, forward citations (in first 3 years), number
of International Patent Classification (IPC) subclasses, patent family size, grant lag (diff. from mean in months), indicators for
international PCT applications, EP patents, and accelerated examination. Technology effects include indicators for each main
technology area (electrical engineering, instruments, chemistry, mechanical engineering, other). Court effects include indicators
for each German and U.K. court.
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ONLINE APPENDIX – NOT FOR PUBLICATION
A Appendix: German legal system
Infringement
A patent holder initiates the infringement proceedings by filing an infringement action.
The patent holder can seek different forms of legal relief; for example, a cease and desist
order to halt the infringing act, the recall and destruction of infringing goods, rendering
of account to identify distribution channels and calculate damages, or damages for
losses suffered. The patent holder can also request a preliminary injunction against the
alleged infringer. However in practice, preliminary injunctions are rare because they
require clear-cut evidence regarding the infringing act, the validity of the patent, and
urgency (Kühnen, 2012).46
The main oral hearing takes place roughly between five to twelve months after the
action was filed. Main oral hearings rarely exceed one day and often last for only a few
hours. In case of a parallel validity challenge, the judges may grant the request to stay
the proceeding until a decision on the patent’s validity is available (see Section 2.1.2 in
the main text). If the infringement action is not stayed, the judges hand down a written
judgment usually four to ten weeks after the main oral hearing, which concludes the
proceeding in first instance. Alternatively, the litigants may settle at any time during
the proceeding. The ‘winner’ can demand the reimbursement of legal costs from the
losing party.47
In the proceeding, the defendant may dispute the infringement allegations, but the
possible invalidity of a patent does not constitute an admissible defense. The alleged in-
fringer has to challenge the patent’s validity through a separate opposition or invalidity
action.
Invalidity
The alleged infringer may challenge a granted patent through opposition or, subse-
quently, an invalidity action – which require separate proceedings from the infringe-
ment action. An opposition to an EP (DE) patent can be filed at the EPO (DPMA)
within the first 9 months (3 months) after grant of the patent. After this period, the
alleged infringer may still join an already pending opposition proceeding. It is note-
worthy that the EPO and DPMA may continue the proceeding ex officio and decide on
validity even if the opponent withdraws the opposition. If invalidated, the patent is
46An injunction might be granted, for example, if the suspected infringer is about to start selling a
product that clearly infringes a patent that is most likely valid and where selling the infringing product
would result in substantial losses for the patent holder. That said, although there has been a recent
increase in the number of preliminary injunctions (Müller-Stoy and Wahl, 2008), they are still a relatively
rare occurrence in patent litigation (Böhler, 2011).
47Legal costs include court fees, attorney-at-law as well as patent attorney fees, and further expenses,
such as travel or translation costs. Attorneys may charge their clients significantly higher fees than those
eligible for reimbursement, thus legal costs are not always shifted entirely to the losing party.
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deemed void counting from its grant date.48 Each litigant usually bears his own costs
of the opposition proceeding.
After the end of the opposition phase, or – in case of an opposition – after the end of
the opposition proceeding, validity can be challenged only through an invalidity action
at the BPatG. Although an invalidity action can be filed by any person or legal entity,
almost all invalidity actions are filed in response to infringement actions.49
Unlike in opposition proceedings, the plaintiff has full discretion to withdraw his
action at any time. As in the case of oppositions, if the BPatG invalidates a patent, it is
invalid since its grant date. The winning party of the invalidity proceeding can demand
the reimbursement of legal costs from the losing party.
B Appendix: U.K. legal system
As in the case of Germany, patent holders initiate infringement proceedings by filing a
claim with either the IPEC or PHC seeking different forms of relief. After the filing of
the claim form, the defendant files a response, in which he declares whether he raises
any defence. The response usually already states whether the defendant counterclaims
for invalidity. Note that unlike in Germany, courts have jurisdiction to decide on valid-
ity regardless of whether the deadline for opposition against an EP patent at the EPO
has lapsed. In case of pending opposition proceedings before the EPO, judges have
discretion to stay proceedings, but in practice have rarely done so.
The main oral hearings take place usually around 12 months after the claim form
has been filed. Oral hearings are a lot more extensive than in Germany with trials
often lasting several days and sometimes even weeks. This is due to more detailed oral
arguments, expert testimony, and cross-examination. In first instance, judgments are
usually handed down within 2-12 weeks of the trial.
C Appendix: Proof of Lemma 1
The patent holder’s expected payoff is given by
G˜nb(S) =

S if S ≤ Snb
Gnb(S) if Snb < S ≤ S¯nb
−CP + αnb2

θ + θ

BP −
 
1−αnb LP if S > S¯nb
where
Gnb(S) =
θ − θˆ nb (S)
θ − θ S +
θˆ nb (S)− θ
θ − θ

−CP + α
nb
2
 
θˆ nb (S) + θ

BP −
 
1−αnb LP
=
1
θ − θ

θ − S − CD
αnb LD

S +

S − CD
αnb LD
− θ

−CP + α
nb
2

S − CD
αnb LD
+ θ

BP −
 
1−αnb LP
48Note that for EP patents, the decision has effect in all states where the opposed patent is in force.
49von Hees and Braitmayer (2010) estimate that this is the case for 90% of all invalidity actions.
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Under the assumption BP = LD, the latter can be simplified into
Gnb(S) =
1
θ − θ
§
−S2
2
+

αnb LDθ − CP −
 
1−αnb LPS + Kª
where K is a term that does not depend on S. Differentiating this with respect to S
yields
dGnb
dS
=
1
θ − θ
§
θ − 1
αnb LD

CP +
 
1−αnb LP + Sª
Since Gnb(S) is a (strictly) concave quadratic function in S, it has a unique uncon-
strained maximum. The value of S at which the unconstrained maximum is reached,
which we denote Snb, is given by the first-order condition
dGnb
dS
= 0
which implies that
Snb = αnbθ LD − CP −
 
1−αnb LP
Since Snb <S¯nb and G˜nb(.) is continuous at S = S¯nb, the patent holder never finds it
optimal to make a settlement offer that is refused by all types of defendants, i.e., an
offer involving an amount greater than S¯nb. Moreover, since G˜nb(.) is increasing in
S over

0, Snb

, the patent holder never finds it optimal to make a settlement offer
involving an amount S < Snb.
Therefore, the equilibrium settlement amount is given by
S˜nb = max
 
Snb, Snb

or, equivalently,
S˜nb =
¨
αnb LDθ − CP −
 
1−αnb LP if θ − θ ≥ CD+CP+(1−αnb)LPαnb LD
αnbθ LD + CD otherwise
Then, denoting θ˜ nb = θˆ nb
 
S˜nb

we get
θ˜ nb =
¨
θ − CP+CD+(1−αnb)LP
αnb LD
if θ − θ ≥ CD+CP+(1−αnb)LP
αnb LD
θ otherwise
Remark 1. If we relax the assumption that BP = LD, then the patent holder may find it
optimal to make a settlement offer which is not accepted by any defendant (which would
be the same as not making an offer at all). To see why, consider the scenario in which
BP > 2LD. In this case, it can be shown that G˜
nb (.) is convex over

Snb, S¯nb

(while it is
concave over this range under the assumption BP = LD). Therefore, the optimal settlement
amount is either Snb, which is accepted by all defendant types, or S¯nb, which is turned
down by all defendant types. Comparing G˜nb
 
Snb

and G˜nb
 
S¯nb

shows that the optimal
settlement amount is S¯nb if
BP >max
2LD, 2
αnb

θ + θ
 αnbθ LD +  1−αnb LP + CP + CD
 .
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D Appendix: Model Extension – Timing
In this section we consider an extension of our model in which i) time is modeled
explicitly, ii) discounting is introduced, and iii) the parties’ payoffs are a special case of
the reduced-form payoffs in our baseline model.
D.1 Non-bifurcated system
Consider the following discrete-time setting. At t = 0, the (future) defendant D takes
an action that infringes the patent with probability θ . At t = Ts > 0, the patent holder
decides whether to sue D for infringement. If he does then he incurs a (lump-sum)
litigation cost CP in that period and the alleged infringer also incurs a litigation cost CD
in the same period.50 We assume that the alleged infringer can file a counterclaim to
challenge the patent’s validity at t = Tc > Ts. If the patent holder engages in litigation
then the court hands down its judgment regarding the infringement, and the patent’s
validity if challenged, at t = T j > Ts. Finally, assume that the expiration date of the
patent is t = T˜ > T j and, therefore, the technology it covers can be used for free from
period T˜ + 1 on.
We assume that the patent holder and the alleged infringer are active in the same
product market and that a third firm, firm E, contemplates the possibility of entering
the market at t = Te with T j < Te ≤ T˜ . If the patent has been invalidated at t = T j then
firm E enters the market at t = Te. Otherwise, it enters the market at t = T˜ + 1.
For the sake of simplicity, we suppose that the three firms are symmetric and that
each firm makes a per-period profit pik whenever active in the market in that period,
with k ∈ {1,2, 3} being the number of firms active in the market in the considered
period. We capture the rent-dissipating effect of competition by assuming that the per-
period industry profits decrease with the number of active firms, i.e., pi1 > 2pi2 > 3pi3.
If the court finds that the patent is valid and infringed it makes the alleged infringer
pay damages to the the patent holder. We suppose that these damages are equal to
the loss incurred by the patent holder because the alleged infringer was active in the
output market. More specifically, denoting δ the patent holder’s and alleged infringer’s
discount factor, the damages that the latter has to pay to the former if the patent is
found valid and infringed are equal to
T j∑
t=0
δt−Ts (pi1 −pi2)
when discounted at the time when the infringement suit starts, i.e., t = Ts (for the sake
of exposition all payoffs will be discounted at t = Ts rather than t = 0). Moreover, when
the court finds the patent to be valid and infringed, it delivers an injunction against the
alleged infringer who cannot be anymore active in the market between periods T j + 1
50Assuming that the patent holder and the alleged infringer incur a litigation cost per period instead of
a lump-sum litigation cost at the beginning of the trial would not affect our analysis: CP and CD would
just need to be interpreted as the sum of the discounted per-period litigation costs.
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and T˜ . The alleged infringer can, and will, however, re-enter the market after the patent
expires, i.e., at t = T˜ + 1.
Let us normalize to 0 the payoffs of the patent holder and the alleged infringer when
the former decides not to sue the latter for infringement. Then the patent holder’s
payoff (discounted to t = Ts) if the patent is found valid and infringed is
−CP +
T j∑
t=0
δt−Ts (pi1 −pi2) +
T˜∑
t=T j+1
δt−Ts (pi1 −pi2) = −CP +
T˜∑
t=0
δt−Ts(pi1 −pi2)
while the alleged infringer’s payoff is given by
−CD −
T j∑
t=0
δt−Ts (pi1 −pi2)−
T˜∑
t=T j+1
δt−Tspi2
Let us now consider the scenario in which the patent is found invalid by the court. The
patent holder’s payoff is then
−CP −
T˜∑
t=Te
δt−Ts (pi2 −pi3)
because the invalidation of the patent makes firm E enter the market at t = Te instead
of t = T˜ +1> Te. This is also why the alleged infringer’s payoff in that case is given by
−CD −
T˜∑
t=Te
δt−Ts (pi2 −pi3)
Finally, let us consider the scenario in which the court finds that the patent is valid but
not infringed. Then, the patent holder’s payoff is −CP and the alleged infringer’s payoff
is −CD.
D.2 Bifurcated system
To account for bifurcation we make the following changes to the above setting. First,
we suppose that the alleged infringer has to incur an additional litigation cost c′D at
t = Tc if he decides to challenge the patent’s validity, and we denote cD the value of
this litigation cost when discounted at t = Ts :
cD = δ
Tc−Ts c′D.
Second, we assume that the court that examines the infringement issue hands down
its judgment at t = T j, and that the court that examines the validity issue (when it is
challenged by the alleged infringer) makes a decision at t = Tv with T j < Tv < Te. The
length of the injunction gap is then given by Tv − T j.
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Third, we suppose that if the patent is found infringed at t = T j, the infringer has
to pay damages to the patent holder equal to those under the non-bifurcated system,51
and faces an injunction that prevents him from being active in the output market from
period t = T j + 1 until t = Tv. If the patent is found valid at t = Tv then the injunction
is confirmed and the infringer cannot re-enter the market before t = T˜ + 1. However,
if the patent is found invalid then the infringer can re-enter the market right after the
invalidity decision, i.e., at t = Tv +1. Moreover, he can recover the damages he had to
pay to the patent holder at t = T j and can claim for compensation for the fact that he
wrongly faced an injunction between periods T j+1 and Tv. To capture the loss (benefit)
that the injunction gap induces for the alleged infringer (patent holder) we assume that
he is not fully compensated: the patent holder pays to the infringer an amount
β
Tv∑
t=T j+1
δt−Tspi2
where β ∈ [0,1], while the alleged infringer’s lost profits from the injunction are
Tv∑
t=T j+1
δt−Tspi2.
Thus, when the patent is found infringed and is subsequently invalidated (which
implies that it was challenged), the patent holder’s payoff is52
−CP +
Tv∑
t=T j+1
δt−Ts [pi1 −pi2 − βpi2]−
T˜∑
t=Te
δt−Ts (pi2 −pi3) = −CP +
Tv∑
t=T j+1
δt−Ts [pi1 − (1+ β)pi2]
−
T˜∑
t=Te
δt−Ts (pi2 −pi3)
while the alleged infringer’s payoff is
−CD − cD −
Tv∑
t=T j+1
δt−Ts (1− β)pi2 −
T˜∑
t=Te
δt−Ts (pi2 −pi3) .
Consider now the scenario in which the patent is found not infringed and is invalidated.
Then, the patent holder’s payoff is
−CP −
T˜∑
t=Te
δt−Ts (pi2 −pi3)
and the alleged infringer’s payoff is
−CD − cD −
T˜∑
t=Te
δt−Tt (pi2 −pi3) .
51More precisely, those damages are equal to
T j∑
t=0
δt−Ts (pi1 −pi2).
52Recall that we normalize to 0 the payoffs of the patent holder and the alleged infringer when the
former decides not to sue the latter for infringement.
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Assume now that the patent is found infringed and is not invalidated. Then, the patent
holder’s payoff is
−CP +
T˜∑
t=0
δt−Ts(pi1 −pi2)
regardless of whether the valildity was not challenged, or was challenged but was up-
held by the court, and the alleged infringer’s payoff is
−CD − cD −
T j∑
t=0
δt−Ts (pi1 −pi2)−
T˜∑
t=T j+1
δt−Tspi2
if he challenged the patent’s validity, and
−CD −
T j∑
t=0
δt−Ts (pi1 −pi2)−
T˜∑
t=T j+1
δt−Tspi2
if he did not.
Finally, if the patent is found not infringed and is not invalidated then the patent
holder’s payoff is −CP (regardless of whether the validity was not challenged, or was
challenged but was upheld by the court), while the alleged infringer’s payoff is−CD−cD
if he challenged the patent’s validity and −CD if he did not.
D.3 Payoff-equivalence with the baseline model
It is straightforward that the payoffs in the above model are a special case of the
reduced-form payoffs of our baseline model, where:
LP =
T˜∑
t=Te
δt−Ts (pi2 −pi3)
ID = −
T˜∑
t=Te
δt−Ts (pi2 −pi3)
BP =
T˜∑
t=0
δt−Ts(pi1 −pi2)
LD =
T j∑
t=0
δt−Ts (pi1 −pi2) +
T˜∑
t=T j+1
δt−Tspi2
lD =
Tv∑
t=T j+1
δt−Ts (1− β)pi2
bP =
Tv∑
t=T j+1
δt−Ts [pi1 − (1+ β)pi2]
This implies that all the results obtained in our baseline model carry over to the model
considered in this extension.
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E Appendix: Variable Description
This appendix describes the construction of the variables used in our analysis.
• Dependent variables
– Validity challenge: for Germany, validity challenge refers to an invalidity pro-
ceeding that occurs parallel to the infringement proceeding and is based on
the same patent. For the U.K., validity challenge refers to a counterclaim
filed by the alleged infringer in the infringement proceeding.
– Settlement: we denote the outcome of a proceeding as settlement if the court
does not render a decision. Settlements may encompass court settlements,
out-of-court settlements, and withdrawn actions.
• Litigating parties
– Size: we categorized companies according to the EU definition into four size
categories using a combination of the number of employees, turnover, and
total assets. If several companies from the same business group appeared as
co-plaintiffs or co-defendants, we allocated the entire business group into
the size category of its largest member.
– Residence: we identified a company’s origin using information available in
the court records, Bureau van Dijk’s FAME and Amadeus databases, as well
as web searchers. We then allocated companies into three categories: do-
mestic (Germany/U.K.), Europe, and rest of the world.
– Top legal representative: For Germany, we identified top law firms in patent
litigation according to a ranking of leading law firms published in 2009 (Top
50 law firms in patent litigation and patent applications in Germany) by the
legal professional journal JUVE Rechtsmarkt. For the U.K. we relied on the
ranking published by Chambers and Partners, so-called Band 1 and Band 2
law firms in London and outside London.
– Non-practicing entity (NPE): we identified NPEs in the German and U.K. data
by identifying the patent holder in each case and we then determined man-
ually, using web searches, news reports, court filings, and the existing aca-
demic literature on NPEs and PAEs whether a patent holder was an NPE at
the time of the court case. For more details see Love et al. (2016).
– Number of parties: we counted the number of independent parties that are
accused of infringement.
– Multinational group: we created a binary variable that indicated whether
alleged infringers with different residences belong to the same multinational
group.
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• Patent characteristics
– Forward citations (in first 3 years): we counted the number of patents citing
the focal patent within the first three years after the earliest publication.
– Backward citations (patents): we counted a patent’s number of citations to
other patents.
– Backward citations (non-patent literature): we counted a patent’s number of
citations to non-patent literature.
– IPC subclasses count: we counted the number of unique IPC subclasses of the
patent.
– Family size (DOCDB): we counted the number of patents that belong to the
same family (according to the DOCDB definition) of the patent.
– EP bundle patent: we created a binary variable that indicates whether a
patent is a European bundle patent (EP).
– PCT application: we created a binary variable that indicates whether a patent
is an international patent application (PCT).
– Accelerated examination requested: we created a binary variable that indi-
cates whether a patent holder requested accelerated examination at the EPO.
– Grant lag (difference from mean in days): we calculated a patent’s grant lag
as the time between start of examination and grant of the patent less the
mean of the average grant lag by patent office.
– Age of patent (in years): we calculated a patent’s age as the time between
the filing of the application (priority) and the start of the infringement pro-
ceeding.
• Invalidity history
– Patent solidified through opposition proceeding: we created a binary variable
that indicates whether a patent went through (and survived) an opposition
proceeding prior to the infringement proceeding.
– Patent challenged through invalidity proceeding: we created a binary variable
that indicates whether a patent’s validity was challenged in an invalidity
proceeding prior to the infringement proceeding.
– Patent solidified through invalidity proceeding: we created a binary variable
that indicates whether a patent’s validity was confirmed by adjudication in
an invalidity proceeding prior to the infringement proceeding.
• Proceeding
– Parallel opposition proceeding: we created a binary variable that indicates
whether a patent is subject to a pending opposition proceeding parallel to
the infringement proceeding.
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– Litigation value (in th €): the litigating parties specify the value of the case
on the claim form.
– Multi-jurisdictional litigation: we identified court cases where the same patent
(family) is litigated in multiple jurisdictions (France, Germany, the Nether-
lands, the U.K.). This information is only available for the period 2000-2008.
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F Appendix: Figures
Figure A-1: Court structure in Germany’s patent litigation system (Cremers et al., 2016,
amended)
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Figure A-2: Court structure in U.K.’s patent litigation system (Cremers et al., 2016,
amended)
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Figure A-3: Timing of infringement and invalidity actions in parallel proceedings
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Figure A-4: Length of (first instance) infringement proceedings and invalidity proceed-
ings by year
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Figure A-5: Number and share of divergent decisions over time
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ceedings excluding settlements includes settlements in the infringement but not invalidity proceeding.
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Table A-2: Final outcome to divergent decisions
Invalidity outcome
Infringement outcome reversed settled binding Total
reversed 2 0 6 8
1.4% 0.0% 4.1% 5.5%
settled 8 11 37 56
5.5% 7.6% 25.5% 38.6%
binding 13 6 62 81
9.0% 4.1% 42.8% 55.9%
Total 23 17 105 145
15.8% 11.7% 72.4% 100.0%
Notes: Sample: The sample consists of all infringement proceedings with a divergent decision. The unit of observation is at the
patent in each infringement proceeding. The observable outcome of oppositions is by definition binding. Settlements are broadly
defined and include withdrawn appeals.
White area: divergent decisions eventually reversed by the respective appeals court.
Light gray-shaded area: divergent decisions where at least one appeal proceeding ended with a settlement.
Dark gray-shaded area: divergent decisions that remained unaltered due to lack of appeal or an affirmative decision by the appeals
court.
Table A-3: Summary statistics grouped by parallel invalidity proceeding
No parallel invalidity proc. Parallel invalidity pro.
Mean Std. err. Min Max Mean Std. err. Min Max
Germany N=1,597 N=932
Alleged infringer
Micro 0.12 0.32 0 1 0.08 0.27 0 1
Small 0.17 0.37 0 1 0.14 0.35 0 1
Medium 0.27 0.45 0 1 0.25 0.43 0 1
Large 0.44 0.50 0 1 0.53 0.50 0 1
Germany 0.71 0.45 0 1 0.82 0.38 0 1
Europe (excl. Germany) 0.23 0.42 0 1 0.16 0.36 0 1
World (excl. Europe) 0.06 0.24 0 1 0.02 0.15 0 1
Number of parties 1.06 0.33 1 6 1.08 0.56 1 15
Multinational group 0.07 0.25 0 1 0.13 0.34 0 1
Top legal representative 0.43 0.49 0 1 0.61 0.49 0 1
Patent holder
Non-practicing entity 0.15 0.35 0 1 0.12 0.32 0 1
Micro 0.14 0.34 0 1 0.13 0.33 0 1
Small 0.10 0.30 0 1 0.11 0.32 0 1
Medium 0.16 0.37 0 1 0.16 0.37 0 1
Large 0.60 0.49 0 1 0.60 0.49 0 1
Germany 0.53 0.50 0 1 0.53 0.50 0 1
Continued on next page
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Table A-3 – continued from previous page
No parallel invalidity proceeding Parallel invalidity proceeding
Variables Mean Std. err. Min Max Mean Std. err. Min Max
Europe (excl. Germany) 0.26 0.44 0 1 0.31 0.46 0 1
World (excl. Europe) 0.21 0.41 0 1 0.16 0.37 0 1
Top legal representative 0.72 0.45 0 1 0.73 0.44 0 1
Invalidity history
Patent solidified (opp. proc.) 0.15 0.36 0 1 0.20 0.40 0 1
Patent challenged (rev. proc.) 0.12 0.32 0 1 0.05 0.23 0 1
Patent solidified (rev. proc.) 0.04 0.19 0 1 0.02 0.13 0 1
Proceeding
Parallel opposition proceeding 0.06 0.24 0 1 0.03 0.17 0 1
Litigation value (in th €) 1409.73 2827.36 0 30000 1202.04 2495.29 2 38348
Multi-jurisdictional litigation 0.03 0.18 0 1 0.05 0.22 0 1
Year of infringement action 2004.60 2.52 2000 2008 2004.50 2.43 2000 2008
Length of proceeding (in days) 372.64 330.08 0 3847 613.36 534.13 0 3847
LG Düsseldorf 0.72 0.45 0 1 0.68 0.46 0 1
LG Mannheim 0.21 0.41 0 1 0.25 0.43 0 1
LG Munich 0.07 0.26 0 1 0.07 0.25 0 1
LG judgment appealed 0.34 0.47 0 1 0.58 0.49 0 1
Patent characteristics
Forward citations (in first 3 years) 3.19 6.49 0 151 2.98 6.29 0 86
Backward citations (patents) 3.43 3.08 0 25 3.68 3.60 0 32
Backward citations (non-patent) 0.74 1.74 0 22 0.91 2.08 0 17
IPC subclasses count 3.27 3.31 1 34 2.95 2.68 1 20
Family size (DOCDB) 10.62 13.92 1 255 9.90 10.62 1 74
EP bundle patent 0.74 0.44 0 1 0.72 0.45 0 1
PCT application 0.21 0.41 0 1 0.24 0.43 0 1
Year of filing (priority) 1991.99 4.81 1979 2004 1992.12 4.75 1978 2005
Accelerated examination requested 0.13 0.34 0 1 0.17 0.37 0 1
Grant lag (diff. from mean in months) 3.05 20.90 -84 106 3.16 21.22 -40 112
Age of patent (in years) 11.77 4.49 2 25 11.48 4.36 1 23
Technology area
Electrical engineering 0.31 0.46 0 1 0.24 0.43 0 1
Instruments 0.10 0.30 0 1 0.15 0.36 0 1
Chemistry 0.11 0.31 0 1 0.13 0.34 0 1
Mechanical engineering 0.31 0.46 0 1 0.30 0.46 0 1
Other 0.17 0.38 0 1 0.18 0.38 0 1
U.K. N=142 N=319
Alleged infringer
Micro 0.13 0.33 0 1 0.14 0.35 0 1
Small 0.08 0.28 0 1 0.10 0.30 0 1
Medium 0.15 0.36 0 1 0.07 0.26 0 1
Large 0.63 0.48 0 1 0.68 0.47 0 1
Continued on next page
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Table A-3 – continued from previous page
No parallel invalidity proceeding Parallel invalidity proceeding
Variables Mean Std. err. Min Max Mean Std. err. Min Max
Germany 0.80 0.40 0 1 0.87 0.34 0 1
Europe (excl. UK) 0.03 0.17 0 1 0.10 0.30 0 1
World (excl. Europe) 0.15 0.36 0 1 0.03 0.17 0 1
Top legal representative 0.42 0.49 0 1 0.42 0.49 0 1
Non-practicing entity 0.08 0.28 0 1 0.09 0.29 0 1
Patent holder
Non-practicing entity 0.15 0.35 0 1 0.12 0.32 0 1
Micro 0.15 0.36 0 1 0.11 0.31 0 1
Small 0.04 0.20 0 1 0.04 0.19 0 1
Medium 0.02 0.14 0 1 0.04 0.19 0 1
Large 0.79 0.41 0 1 0.82 0.39 0 1
Germany 0.27 0.45 0 1 0.41 0.49 0 1
Europe (excl. Germany) 0.54 0.50 0 1 0.21 0.41 0 1
World (excl. Europe) 0.13 0.34 0 1 0.35 0.48 0 1
Top legal representative 0.45 0.50 0 1 0.45 0.50 0 1
Invalidity history
Patent solidified (opp. proc.) 0.09 0.29 0 1 0.07 0.25 0 1
Proceeding
Parallel opposition proceeding 0.09 0.29 0 1 0.22 0.41 0 1
Litigation value (in th €) 114.15 1092.80 0 13000 45.17 200.39 0 2000
Year of infringement action 2009.53 3.12 2001 2013 2009.08 3.14 2000 2013
PCC court 0.18 0.38 0 1 0.13 0.34 0 1
PCC reform 0.13 0.34 0 1 0.11 0.31 0 1
Patent characteristics
Forward citations (in first 3 years) 4.05 8.74 0 65 3.05 6.92 0 38
Backward citations (patents) 3.92 3.94 0 27 3.14 3.53 0 18
Backward citations (non-patent) 1.13 3.09 0 30 1.21 3.33 0 30
IPC subclasses count 3.70 4.00 0 20 3.33 4.01 0 36
Family size (DOCDB) 15.86 16.93 0 80 20.13 20.08 0 136
EP bundle patent 0.78 0.41 0 1 0.74 0.44 0 1
PCT application 0.27 0.44 0 1 0.46 0.50 0 1
Year of filing (priority) 1996.13 6.25 1984 2009 1997.86 5.71 1981 2011
Accelerated examination requested 0.21 0.41 0 1 0.28 0.45 0 1
Grant lag (diff. from mean in months) 7.64 21.33 -36 68 -0.55 21.93 -44 105
Age of patent (in years) 12.45 5.92 0 25 10.53 5.23 0 25
Technology area
Electrical engineering 0.43 0.50 0 1 0.31 0.46 0 1
Instruments 0.06 0.24 0 1 0.11 0.31 0 1
Chemistry 0.18 0.38 0 1 0.18 0.39 0 1
Mechanical engineering 0.17 0.38 0 1 0.27 0.44 0 1
Other 0.11 0.31 0 1 0.11 0.31 0 1
Notes: The sample consists of all infringement proceedings without judgment during the first 120 days. The unit of observation
is at the patent-case level, i.e., each patent in each infringement proceeding is treated as a separate case.
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Table A-4: Validity challenge and settlement rates by jurisdiction
Validity challenge Settlement
DE UK DE UK
Technology area
Electrical engineering 222 99 349 57
31.0% 61.9% 63.8% 56.4%
Instruments 140 34 79 8
47.3% 79.1% 35.6% 34.8%
Chemistry 123 59 96 9
41.4% 70.2% 40.5% 15.5%
Mechanical engineering 281 85 246 22
36.2% 78.0% 38.3% 34.9%
Other 166 34 150 11
37.4% 69.4% 40.4% 39.3%
Alleged infringer
Micro 71 46 87 13
27.7% 71.9% 37.7% 39.4%
Small 135 32 141 10
33.5% 72.7% 41.8% 33.3%
Medium 233 23 267 22
34.8% 51.1% 49.4% 73.3%
Large 493 217 425 67
41.1% 70.7% 46.7% 34.7%
Domestic 765 278 604 91
40.2% 71.1% 40.7% 38.1%
Europe (excl. domestic) 146 31 262 2
28.7% 88.6% 61.4% 11.1%
World (excl. Europe) 21 9 54 16
17.7% 29.0% 49.5% 61.6%
Notes: The sample used in column 1 consists of all DE infringement proceedings without judgment during the first 120 days. The
sample used in column 2 consists of all UK infringement proceedings. The sample used in column 3 consists of all DE infringement
proceedings without judgment during the first 120 days or settlement after the filing of an invalidity action. The sample used in
column 4 consists of all infringement proceedings without settlement after the filing of a validity challenge counter-claim. The
unit of observation is at the patent-case-level.
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Table A-5: Probit model results: incidence of invalidity action (UK)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Action filed Action filed Action filed Action filed
Alleged infringer
Small (d) −0.007 (0.101) −0.172 (0.144) −0.164 (0.138) −0.173 (0.146)
Medium (d) 0.044 (0.102) 0.031 (0.092) 0.010 (0.102) 0.039 (0.093)
Large (d) 0.059 (0.077) −0.018 (0.077) −0.027 (0.078) −0.039 (0.080)
Europe (excl. Germany) (d) 0.124∗ (0.065) 0.178∗∗∗ (0.041) 0.163∗∗∗ (0.047)
World (excl. Europe) (d) −0.500∗∗∗ (0.172) −0.468∗∗ (0.196) −0.492∗∗∗ (0.180)
Top legal representative (d) 0.003 (0.061) 0.019 (0.062)
Patent holder
Non-practicing entity (d) −0.120 (0.097) −0.178 (0.109) −0.219∗ (0.115)
Small (d) 0.059 (0.088) 0.041 (0.094) 0.051 (0.090)
Medium (d) 0.166∗∗∗ (0.052) 0.149∗∗∗ (0.057) 0.151∗∗∗ (0.054)
Large (d) 0.298∗∗ (0.118) 0.334∗∗∗ (0.119) 0.343∗∗∗ (0.120)
Europe (excl. Germany) (d) −0.250∗∗ (0.099) −0.257∗∗ (0.102) −0.240∗∗ (0.106)
World (excl. Europe) (d) 0.036 (0.084) 0.063 (0.079) 0.058 (0.083)
Top legal representative (d) −0.222∗∗∗ (0.074) −0.243∗∗∗ (0.078)
Invalidity history
Patent solidified (opp. proc.) (d) 0.046 (0.085) 0.069 (0.094)
Proceeding
Parallel opposition proceeding (d) 0.102∗ (0.058) 0.137∗∗∗ (0.048) 0.138∗∗∗ (0.048)
Litigation value (in th €, log) 0.023 (0.014) −0.005 (0.031) −0.001 (0.032)
Controls
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Technology effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Court effects No Yes Yes Yes
Patent characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.208 0.325 0.391 0.391
Observations 461 461 461 411
Marginal effects reported; Case-clustered standard errors in parentheses;
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: The sample consists of all infringement proceedings without settlement/judgment during the first 90 days counting from
the filing date of the case. The dependent variable is equal to one if the defendant challenged validity through an invalidity coun-
terclaim in the same proceedings. The unit of observation is at the patent-case level. Cases with multiple patents are weighted to
account for oversampling. Sample in column (4) excludes patents with a parallel infringement proceeding in Germany. Baseline
litigant size: micro. Baseline litigant residence: UK. Patent characteristics not reported in the table include patent age (in years),
patent age (in years, squared), patent and non-patent backward citations, forward citations (in first 3 years), number of Interna-
tional Patent Classification (IPC) subclasses, patent family size, grant lag (diff. from mean in months), indicators for international
PCT applications, EP patents, and accelerated examination. Technology effects include indicators for each main technology area
(electrical engineering, instruments, chemistry, mechanical engineering, other). Court effects include an indicator variable for the
IPEC.
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Table A-6: Probit model results: incidence of settlement (UK)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Case settled Case settled Case settled Case settled
Alleged infringer
Small (d) 0.074 (0.160) 0.348∗ (0.184) 0.467∗∗∗ (0.167) 0.491∗∗∗ (0.175)
Medium (d) 0.134 (0.198) 0.258 (0.217) 0.362∗ (0.210) 0.529∗∗∗ (0.192)
Large (d) −0.079 (0.120) 0.060 (0.134) 0.124 (0.129) 0.232∗ (0.134)
Europe (excl. Germany) (d) −0.273∗∗∗ (0.096) −0.312∗∗∗ (0.076) −0.311∗∗∗ (0.079)
World (excl. Europe) (d) 0.397∗∗ (0.195) 0.361 (0.224) 0.319 (0.249)
Top legal representative (d) 0.140 (0.128) 0.269∗ (0.149)
Patent holder
Non-practicing entity (d) −0.135 (0.124) −0.131 (0.128) −0.118 (0.128)
Small (d) −0.207 (0.148) −0.238∗∗ (0.119) −0.257∗∗ (0.112)
Medium (d) −0.252∗ (0.131) −0.282∗∗∗ (0.098) −0.319∗∗∗ (0.072)
Large (d) −0.337∗ (0.175) −0.325∗ (0.192) −0.370∗ (0.217)
Europe (excl. Germany) (d) 0.245∗ (0.149) 0.253∗ (0.150) 0.193 (0.155)
World (excl. Europe) (d) −0.005 (0.149) −0.002 (0.152) −0.066 (0.152)
Top legal representative (d) −0.034 (0.111) 0.023 (0.129)
Invalidity history
Patent solidified (opp. proc.) (d) −0.159 (0.121) −0.316∗∗∗ (0.061)
Proceeding
Parallel opposition proceeding (d) −0.275∗∗∗ (0.084) −0.296∗∗∗ (0.079) −0.330∗∗∗ (0.076)
Litigation value (in th €, log) −0.029 (0.027) −0.148∗∗ (0.066) −0.191∗∗∗ (0.072)
Controls
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Technology effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Court effects No Yes Yes Yes
Patent characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.187 0.327 0.353 0.381
Observations 246 246 246 207
Marginal effects reported; Case-clustered standard errors in parentheses;
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: The sample consists of all infringement proceedings without settlement/judgment during the first 90 days counting from
the filing date of the case and without settlement after the filing of a patent validity counterclaim. The dependent variable is equal
to one if the defendant challenged validity through an invalidity counterclaim in the same proceedings. The unit of observation is
at the patent-case level. Cases with multiple patents are weighted to account for oversampling. Sample in column (4) excludes
patents with a parallel infringement proceeding in Germany. Baseline litigant size: micro. Baseline litigant residence: UK. Patent
characteristics not reported in the table include patent age (in years), patent age (in years, squared), patent and non-patent
backward citations, forward citations (in first 3 years), number of International Patent Classification (IPC) subclasses, patent family
size, grant lag (diff. from mean in months), indicators for international PCT applications, EP patents, and accelerated examination.
Technology effects include indicators for each main technology area (electrical engineering, instruments, chemistry, mechanical
engineering, other). Court effects include an indicator variable for the IPEC.
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